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
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
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AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

AN INTRODUCTION

— TO —

ENGLISH GRAMMAR

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

THE LOGICAL STUDY OF THE SENTENCE.

BY

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TORONTO:

THE COPP, CLARK COMPANY, LIMITED.

1899.

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PREFACE.

It is generally agreed among teachers that the materials for the study of grammar must be provided by the teacher and that the pupil must do the thinking. The exercises given here are arranged so as to indicate the proper order of topics in the scientific study of the subject, and are suggestive merely, not exhaustive. According to the plan of study described in the following pages, the student does not enter upon the great field of historical grammar until he has become familiar with the nature of the sentence and the relation of its elements. It is not intended that this book shall take the place of standard school texts now in use. It is merely a preparation for the more advanced study of English grammar as taken up by the standard writers.

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SECTION I.

ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

CHAPTER I.

I.—MEDIÆVAL AND MODERN IDEAS OF GRAMMAR.

1. Descriptive and Historical Grammar Distinguished.

In this brief survey of the field of elementary grammar, we intend to examine the nature of the sentence or proposition, its elements, and their relation. No attempt will be made to deal with the subject of historical grammar. Our task will be to describe what is to be found in English speech to-day. We shall not be concerned with the steps which have led to the present stage of the language. To study historical grammar we should have to examine the

**Method of
historical
study.**

various forms which the language has assumed in every stage of its progress. Our materials would be collected from all ages and lands where the tongue has been

spoken. It would be necessary to begin at the beginning and arrange these materials so as to exhibit the sequence and relation of part to part. We should have to show how such and such a part is related to that which went before and to that which came after. It would be necessary to explain each phenomenon by reference to its cause, and to set forth in general expressions the law or laws governing the development of the language.

Descriptive or logical grammar differs from historical grammar in much the same way as physiology and biology, the former dealing with the organic structure and condition of living beings, the latter with the relations of the different orders of animal existence. Our language as a whole has undergone modifications, and every idiom imbedded in its structure has its own story to tell. The history of the language can be related by the grammarian just as that of the development of a living organism can be exhibited by the biologist. As the language which

**Descriptive
grammar
comes first.**

we speak and write to-day is of more importance to us than the language of the past, we study the logical or descriptive side of the subject first. This will

prepare the way for a better understanding of the historical phase, and in the meantime we shall learn something of the real nature of English speech, and something of the formal laws of thought.

It is essential to a right understanding of the subject that the fields of descriptive and historical grammar be clearly distinguished. As the subject is usually treated in the school texts, the two fields are not kept separate and distinct from each other. It is usual to begin with an historical sketch to exhibit the geographical distribution of the various branches of the family to which our language belongs, and then to render an account of the influences which have been at work to produce certain changes in structure, vocabulary, and pronunciation. At length the student finds himself face to face with his own language. Hitherto he has been engaged in studying the history of the language, the progress of its development. We are given to understand that this preliminary survey is a necessary preparation for the study of the structure of the language, that only on the historical basis can the structure be intelligently explained, that "Old English is the right key to the under-

standing of Modern English," and that "those who will not use this key will never open the lock with all their fumbling." We believe, however, that the structure of English speech can be intelligently explained and understood without any historical introduction; that an historical sketch of the progress of the language should follow, not precede, descriptive grammar; and that, properly speaking, a knowledge of the development of the language not only fails to aid us in understanding its present structure, but can itself only be attained by the help and in the light of descriptive grammar.

2. Analytic and Synthetic Languages.

Before we can make much progress in the problem of how to deal with the grammar of English, we must consider the chief point of difference between it and other tongues. If we set aside the question of vocabulary we shall find that this difference is indicated by the words analytic and synthetic. Old English is called a synthetic tongue as distinct from Modern English, which is analytic. It will be necessary to examine this distinction somewhat closely.

What is called a free arrangement of the

words composing a sentence is characteristic of certain languages of which Latin may be taken as a type. If the precise relation of an idea can be expressed by means of a flectional syllable to be added to the stem which represents the primary idea, it is clear that the speaker may arrange the words of his sentence in any order he chooses. He has no freedom in the selection of forms. The grammatical dependence between words is indicated by certain fixed endings, each of which stands definitely for some "accident" of the main or generic idea. Attributive words assume the dress of the words they qualify. Each word may be recognized by its peculiar garb according to the part it has to play. It wears the livery of its chief; and being thus easily recognized, there is nothing to be said in favour of one order of words more than another in the interests of clearness, though certain arrangements may be made with an eye to symmetry or cadence.

It is obvious that a free system of syntax can be employed only in the case of an inflectional language, and that if inflections disappear the user of language must employ some other device to indicate the relation of words in the sentence.

If we say "The king the villain slew," we have not provided our hearers with any means of discovering what we mean exactly. What comes after or before may be of some assistance. But within the sentence itself there is nothing

In English,
position
takes the
place of
forms.

to indicate who was slain. It was found that by placing a word in a certain position, its relation could be denoted with sufficient clearness, and it is chiefly by this means that clearness is secured in English, though a few inflections still remain in use.

The chief concern of the grammar of a language like Latin is inflection. The study of English grammar may proceed along the lines of Latin by taking as the basis the few inflections that have survived. Upon such basis an ideal system of declensions and conjugations may be set up which shall bear some resemblance to the classical model. Let us take the word "man." If we confine our system to three "cases" of the noun we shall have :

	SINGULAR.	PLURAL.
<i>Nominative</i>	Man.	Men.
<i>Possessive</i>	Man's.	Men's.
<i>Objective</i>	Man.	Men.

Here we observe that although there is no pretence of a dative, ablative, vocative, instrumental or locative, yet the so-called objective or accusative which has been retained does not differ from the so-called nominative, and all we have remaining to keep us in countenance is the "possessive." But for it the whole system must have collapsed. The "possessive" has saved the situation.

The present tense of the indicative mood of the verb appears thus:

	SINGULAR.	PLURAL.
<i>1st person</i>	I love.	We love.
<i>2nd person</i>	Thou lovest.	Ye love.
	or You love.	or You love.
<i>3rd person</i>	He loveth.	They love.
	or He loves.	

The forms "lovest" and "loveth" are used only upon rare special occasions and for special purposes, and hence we may fairly say that in this instance the only distinction we have left is in regard to the third person of the singular.

It is unnecessary to multiply examples. The tendency of English has been to get rid of its inflections as fast as possible, and a system of grammar based on inflections is contrary to the

genius of the language. In a system so devised we may expect to find a number of unused forms, and a large number of deviations from the pre-conceived rules. The science of grammar, if it is to render a clear account of phenomena it sets out to investigate, must proceed in conformity with the character of the language as it exists, and not according to preordained theories of what it should be.*

*We must now glance briefly at the results of a scientific investigation of English grammar and the modifications they necessitate in our conception of it. The idea that the free use of speech is tied down by the rules of the grammarian must first be given up; all that the grammarian can do is to formulate the current uses of his time which are determined by habit and custom, and are accordingly in a perpetual state of flux. We must next get rid of the notion that English grammar should be modelled after that of ancient Rome; until we do so, we shall never understand even the elementary principles upon which it is based. We cannot speak of declensions, since English has no genders, except in the pronouns of the third person, and no cases except the genitive and a few traces of an old dative. The verbal conjugation is essentially different from that of an inflectional language like Latin and cannot be compressed into the same categories. In English the syntax has enlarged at the expense of the accidence; position has taken the place of forms. To speak of an adjective agreeing with its substantive is as misleading as to speak of a verb governing a case. In fact the distinction between noun and adjective is inapplicable to English grammar and should be replaced by a distinction between objective and attributive words. In a phrase like "this is a cannon," cannon is objective; in a phrase like "a cannon ball," it is attributive, and to call it a substantive in one case and an adjective in another is only to introduce confusion. With the exception of the nominative, the various forms of the noun are all attributive; there is no difference, for example, between "doing a thing" and "doing badly." Apart from the personal pronouns, the accusative of the classical language can be represented only by position; but if we were to say that a

3. *The Attempt to Force the Framework of Latin on English.*

It is quite probable that the first writers on English grammar were classical scholars who undertook their work with the idea that wherever English differed from the classical languages it differed for the worse. They brought to the

noun which follows a verb is in the accusative case, we should have to define "king" as an accusative in such a sentence as "he became king" or "he is king." In conversational English "it is me" is as correct as "c'est moi," in French, or "det er mig" in Danish; the literary "it is I" is due to the influence of classical grammar. The combination of noun or pronoun and preposition results in a compound attribute. As for the verb, Mr. Sweet has well said that "the really characteristic feature of the English finite verb is its inability to stand alone without a pronominal prefix." Thus "dream" by itself is a noun; "I dream" is a verb. The place of the pronominal prefix may be taken by a noun, though both poetry and vulgar English frequently insert the pronoun even when the noun precedes. The number of inflected verbal forms is but small, being confined to the third person singular and the special forms of the preterite and past participle, though the latter may with more justice be regarded as belonging to the province of the lexicographer rather than to that of the grammarian. The inflected subjunctive (be, were, save, in "God Save the Queen," etc.) is rapidly disappearing. New inflected forms however are coming into existence; at all events we have as good a right to consider "wont," "shant," "cant" new inflected forms as the French *aimerai* (*amare habes*) *aimerais* (*amare habebam*). If the ordinary grammars are correct in treating forms like "I am loving," "I was loving," "I did love" as separate tenses they are strangely inconsistent in omitting to notice the equally important emphatic form "I do love" or the negative form "I do not love" (*I dont love*) as well as the semi-inflectional "I'll love," "he's loving." It is true that these later contracted forms are heard only in conversation and not seen in books; but the grammar of language it must be remembered is made by those who speak it and not by the printers. —Article "Grammar" (*A. H. S.*), *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

study of English the determination to organize or reorganize the language on the ancient models in order to furnish the world with a canon which should decide all doubtful cases of usage, and thus retard a process which they could not but look upon as one of degeneration. This attitude of mind is not unlike that of scientists generally before the advent of Bacon and the experimental school. There were certain theories, and the business of the scientist was to discover and admire those instances in which nature behaved as the theories declared she ought to behave, and to look with disapproval and some uneasiness upon those instances in which she behaved contrary to those theories.

We may feel tolerably sure that there is no man or body of men powerful enough to impose a restriction or an idiom upon the language. At best such restriction can exert but a local or temporary influence, and must inevitably be swept away unless it is in conformity with the genius and tendency of the language. A few snags here and there have from time to time caused a temporary obstruction in the stream. Some inflections have been worn smooth and others have disappeared altogether. If it falls

to the lot of any man to lay down rules for the government of those who are to use language, that man is certainly not the grammarian. His business is not to legislate but to record. Grammar is no branch of morals or government. We may be quite sure that it is one of the sciences of classification, and that in pursuing the study we shall be quite safe in adhering strictly to the logic of science.

The early grammarians did not take this view of the case. They looked upon grammar as constituting a certain set of formulas which when mastered should enable the learner to carry on his thinking in a certain manner. They began a system of classification of words corresponding to their classification of things. The distinction between substance and attribute furnished them with a class of words to be called nouns and another to be called adjectives. A division was made among nouns to exhibit the distinction between physical and metaphysical substances. Categories of words were thus agreed upon, and the word—a part of speech—was taken as the unit of their system. Their effort was to build up a system upon distinctions found

in Latin instead of basing it upon the nature of English.*

We have seen that the first wrong step was taken in the attempt to found a system of English grammar on the narrow basis of inflection. The mistake of regarding the word as the unit of grammar is one to which the first seems naturally to lead. But if grammar is to be based on the nature of language, if the science is to be regarded as rendering such an account of the language as shall show us something of the natural way of thinking, we must take for our

<p>The unit of grammar is the sentence.</p>	<p>unit the sentence or proposition which is the expression of a judgment, the original and primary mental act out</p>
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* "To force the grammatical framework of one language upon another is to misconceive the whole nature of the latter and seriously to mislead the learner."—Article "Grammar" (*A. H. S.*), *Encycl. Brit.*

"The argument which used to be urged for the early and persistent study of Latin—namely that it cleared up English grammar so—was not without its naïve element of truth. It certainly did make clear this kind of grammar. It was like that time-honoured advice to young physicians: 'If you don't know the disease your patient is suffering from, give him one that you do know and cure that.' Under such conditions, the study of grammar, like calling in a doctor, was serious business. You first learned what English grammar would have been, had English had the good fortune to be Latin; and then you learned Latin grammar to explain it all."—*Mark Liddell, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 82, p. 98.*

of which language grows. The scientist who approaches his material unhampered by classical prejudices will enquire into the nature of the language he proposes to study. This language, he will say, is an attempt to express thought in some sort of way, a way of its own, though not the classical way. Its inflections are but a small and unimportant feature, merely survivals.

4. Grammar, a Science of Classification.

The kind of grammar which we have been describing was not by any means barren of result. It furnished opportunities for discipline of the logical powers. There were the important processes of logical division and definition, and the identification of instances belonging to one or other of certain more or less strictly defined classes. It is obvious that the sole value of such exercises is in the mental discipline they furnish, in the rigorous application of the rules of logic. When the rules of logic are ignored we can only look for vicious habits of thought as the result, and unfortunately in many cases the rules governing division and definition were grossly neglected. Further, these exercises, important as they un-

doubtedly are when performed in strict accordance with logical rules, form only a part of the scientific study of a subject like grammar. There are certain operations in the prosecution of this science which must in the very nature of things precede those which have been named.

The proper method of grammatical study. Before we can divide and define, we must first observe and compare. It is here that the chief weakness of the old method of procedure comes into full view. The method was not the method of discovery. Instead of examining the facts of the language with the view of detecting similarities and differences, we were expected to employ our time in identifying cases of agreement with rules and definitions prescribed for us by someone else. The old grammarians attempted to construct a system of English grammar on the wrong basis, with the wrong unit, and by the wrong method. If we rightly apprehend the nature of English grammar it is a science of classification, and must proceed according to the principles of inductive method, its unit is the sentence regarded as the expression of a judgment, and its material is the language that we speak day by day, a language which has dis-

carded the cumbrous full dress inflections of the past, and goes about unimpeded in working-day garb.

Carried on in this way the study of grammar cannot fail to be a valuable mental discipline. The student is called upon to exercise the logical power at every step. We are told that all sciences properly studied will serve this purpose, and this is perfectly true. It is generally admitted that the pursuit of any science may and does furnish opportunities for the employment of logical rules, and hence for perfecting one's knowledge of the science of logic.

**Special
logics.**

It is true that particular sciences are "special logics"; that the terms geology, biology, and physiology and others distinctly imply an allegiance to the highest of the sciences, the science of sciences, logic; that geology means logic applied to explain the formation of the earth's crust; biology, logic applied to the phenomena of life, etc. In practice this important truth is very often lost sight of, and instruction is given in a manner calculated to encourage laxity and inaccuracy rather than methodical habits of thought. Grammar has been no exception to this unfor-

fortunate state of things, and yet it would not be difficult to show that if there is one science more than another which should be treated in strict conformity with logical rules that science is grammar.

Although the materials to be dealt with in each case may vary, the inductive sciences all demand the application of the same logical principles. We are not warranted in neglecting the claims of logic in the case of any science. The procedure in the case of botany, for example, does not admit of any doubt. The student of grammar is called upon to exercise precisely the same powers as the student of botany. They are both concerned with the examination of a certain set of phenomena, with the process of classification in view. The phenomena are different, but not the processes. Observation is necessary in both cases. The discovery of points of similarity as the ground of classification; the detection of difference as the basis of division; the accurate marking of connotation with definition in view: these exercises belong to grammar as much as to botany. The botanist begins by studying the plant, the grammarian

**Grammar
and
botany
compared.**

begins with the sentence. Long before the scientific study of either plant or sentence begins, both plants and sentences are familiar objects of attention. Rough classifications have already been made. Both have been observed, though not critically. Correct and adequate analysis is always preceded by less careful scrutiny of the materials of any scientific study. In the case of the sciences under consideration, when the student has become thoroughly familiar with the different parts of a plant or of a sentence he has simply rendered distinct certain obscure notions already formed. The parallel between these two sciences might with profit be traced much further.

Grammar is much more nearly related to logic than any of these sciences. The material with which grammar deals is language, which is the expression of thought. Logic deals with the formal laws of thought. Grammar examines the nature and elements of the sentence, and the sentence is very closely related to the judgment, which is an original and essential feature of thinking, and present in all its forms and phases. The intimate relationship between these sciences

Grammar is
introductory
logic.

may be indicated by saying that grammar is an introduction to logic; or better, that grammar is introductory logic.

II.—THE STARTING POINT OF LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

1. *The Nature of Judgment.*

Usually, the term judgment is employed to denote that mental operation by which we reach a decision. Numberless instances occur in which past experience is summoned to our aid, and applied to a new case, as when we say that a plan is likely

**Application
of the term
judgment.**

to succeed, a certain course of conduct is morally right, a picture or flower is beautiful. Again, the word is applied to one of three phases of thought proper (conception, judgment, reasoning). In a more extended sense, however, it is used to indicate all mental processes which issue or may issue in an assertion or predication, and this is the sense which is meant when we say that a sentence or proposition is the expression of a judgment. We may

**Judgment
involved
in all
intellection.**

discover the existence of this activity of judging in every mental process from the highest to the lowest, in the most rudimentary discrimination

of sense-presentations as well as in the most highly elaborated types of reasoning. Reasoning or argument is found on a very slight analysis to consist of a series of judgments related to each other in a certain way. "Concepts" are formed as a result of comparison and the discovery of similarity, a process of judging. The very essence of conception is in the processes of judgment by which these products are built up. In the less complicated acts of perception, judgment is at work from the first, transforming and organizing the impressions of sense into related knowledge.

It is said that the essential functions of the fully developed organism are discharged by the primitive cell, and hence the biologist begins with the cell. It is easier to study what is simple than what is complex. In the same way we begin with the judgment as the starting point of thought. The idea of evolution suggests a method of examining the facts of mental life with the view of understanding the nature of thinking.* By this means we are able not only to form a clear idea of the nature of thinking, but also to see that all thinking is one in

* See Creighton's *Introductory Logic*, § 71.

kind, and that judgment is its essential feature.

The law
of
evolution.

Evolution regards the phenomena of any science not as fixed and unchangeable, but as in process of growth and development, and as developing in accordance with certain laws. It teaches us to look for increased complexity of structure and function in the later forms of life as compared with the earlier. This is one side of the process. Accompanying this growth in diversity of structure there is a process of integration in which each part with its own special function becomes essential to the other parts, and to the whole structure. Thinking, then, is not to be regarded as a mechanical process, but as a development from within; a living process, not a dead thing. We shall find that all thinking is more complex in its later than in its earlier stages, just as we find that there is a great difference between a vertebrate and an amœba. The vertebrate possesses a great number of unlike parts, each doing its own work. The amœba is said to be almost of one character throughout;

Its
application
to thought.

without special structure, without special organs. So, in our first attempts at thinking, we are not

able to analyze to any great extent. "The earliest or simplest thinking tends to take things in a lump, without making any distinctions." The knowledge of children and uneducated men is indistinct, fragmentary, unrelated. Later experience enables us to unify and relate the various pieces of knowledge which we have acquired. As progress is made we not only analyze and distinguish things which are different, but we also relate the parts of our knowledge which are essential to each other. That is to say, what characterizes thought is the endeavour to put together what has been discriminated in the form of a related system. Thinking is one in kind throughout. The more complex forms or types grow out of simpler ones of the same kind. If, then, our study of grammar is to give us an insight into the nature of thinking and the formal laws of thought, we must take as our starting point the proposition which is the expression of a judgment, the original and characteristic type of all thinking.

We are not to think of the process of judgment as an external or mechanical process of joining one part to another. The proposition admits of an analysis into subject and predicate, or subject,

copula, and predicate, and this may lead us to think that there is an exactly similar analysis possible whereby the judgment may be divided up into two concepts. As a matter of fact, it is the substitution of words for thoughts which

makes it possible to regard a concept
as an existence in some sort inde-
pendent of its connection in a judg-
ment. But we must bear in mind

**The relation
of concept
and
judgment.**

that although the terms "dog" and "faithful" in the proposition "this dog is faithful" are separate parts of the proposition, yet the concept has no meaning whatever apart from the series of judgments which it represents.

In the psychological process by which the child is enabled to utter a formal judgment, that is to establish a relation between two notions or concepts and to affirm that relation in the form of a proposition, the so-called formal judgment may be considered as a higher mental product than the so-called notion or concept. In the case of a child who makes the affirmation "the bird is in the tree," an analysis will at once indicate that the power which he has shown to establish and to affirm a thought relation between the notions "bird" and "tree," implies a

previous knowledge of these component notions. This is a complex made up of constituents which must have been previously known before the thought relation could have been established. That is to say, no child unacquainted with the notions "bird" and "tree" could possibly establish the thought relation which is the essential feature of the judgment. The mind cannot establish relations between unknown things. But while this is true, it must not be supposed that notion forming and judgment forming belong to two different stages of mental development. It cannot be said that, in the mental process which has been referred to, one stage may be marked off as devoted to the consideration of notions, and another stage belongs to the forming of judgments. Judgment is the primary act in all thinking, and belongs to every stage of mental development. Even at the early stage of his experience where the child exclaims "the bird!" he is giving expression in his own way to what is a true process of judging. Written out at length it means "That is a bird;" or, "See the bird." Further, his power to associate the word with the thing involves a psychological process which we may briefly con-

sider. We must presuppose existing in his mind a more or less clear knowledge of the class. The use of this term is evidence of the fact that he has referred this individual to its appropriate class, which reference is, psychologically, a judgment. In his mind he has affirmed that this individual belongs to that class. Again, that which in the formal judgment appears as a notion is in reality, to him, not simple, but a complex built up as the result of a series of judgments. The consideration of the connotation of this term, that is, reflection upon its whole meaning, will result in the emergence of as many predicates as there were original acts of judgment in its making.*

*2. The Sentence or Proposition the Expression
of a Judgment.*

The judgment itself is an act of mind in which certain constituents are discriminated in order to

*See Creighton's Introductory Logic, § 74, for a full treatment of this point; Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 447. He maintains that: "The sequence of words in a proposition is representative of a sequence in the conscious processes themselves"; Sully's The Human Mind, Chap. xii, § 2, on the Relation of Judgment to Conception. "It is now generally recognized that what we call a concept has no separate existence. . . We never say or think 'man' out of all relation to other things."

be related, and the resulting knowledge is one and indivisible. When we come to set forth a judgment in language the expression may take the form of a single word or of a proposition. Usually it takes the form of a proposition,—that is its explicit and determinate form.

Young children often employ a single word as the vehicle of a wish, command or statement. What is perhaps but a very slight stage in advance of this inexplicit judgment is found in certain impersonal forms, as, "it rains," etc. But apart from these forms of expression altogether, we must keep the fact clearly in mind that a concept really involves the process of judging, although it may not reach the explicit form of a proposition. We see this clearly when we reflect upon such terms as "the cottage on the prairie," and ask ourselves what is the difference between "the cottage on the prairie" and "the cottage is on the prairie." "The red house" calls up precisely the same mental picture as "the house is red." When we trace the process of judgment, as it may readily be traced, through type products of the various stages of intellection we find that in every case the elements of the given idea or

concept are discriminated in order to be related. In judging, we discern or establish a relation between two factors in a complex mental experience. Reflection upon an object, idea, conception brought before the mind as a whole to be analyzed results in the making prominent of some phase or feature of the complex thus vaguely presented, while for the moment the other features are allowed to retire into the background. When we say "the house is red," we set forth in words the results of processes of the kind described. The phase or feature expressed by the word "red" is here brought into prominence and discriminated from the other features in the complex.

Judgment
and
predication.

3. Classification of Sentences.

Before going on to a closer survey of the proposition, it will be well to indicate briefly the various classes into which sentences may be grouped. We shall find that by taking the mental attitude of the speaker as the basis of classification we may arrange simple sentences in four groups or classes. Thus "John is singing" indicates a relation between

Basis of
classification.

the ideas "John" and "singing," and also the mental attitude of the speaker as asserting or declaring that the conception of these ideas as so related corresponds to actual fact. If the speaker is in doubt as to whether the conception of these ideas as so related does or does not correspond to fact, his mental attitude is expressed in the sentence, "Is John singing!" He expresses his wish or will that the fact shall be in accordance with the conception by the sentence, "Sing, John." When his emotion has been aroused to a greater or less degree by a contemplation of the fact, his whole attitude is expressed by the sentence, "How John sings," or "How sweetly he sings." The Declarative and Interrogative sentences imply belief and doubt respectively, each a purely intellectual attitude. Feeling is expressed in the Exclamatory, and Will in the Imperative.

III.—ANALYSIS OF THE SENTENCE.

1. *Forms of Judgment.*

Taking as a type form the declarative sentence which views the relation of the two ideas involved as corresponding to actual fact, we may gather all the forms which judgment assumes

into three groups. In many cases we have the form of subject, copula and predicate. This is the conventional form of the proposition as treated by logic. Great part of mental life is made up of judgments which receive adequate expression in this form of affirmation. We have judgments of resemblance or difference and we say "John is as tall as his brother"; the relation may be that of space (or time) as "the book is on the table"; or it may be that in which action is attributed to an agent, as "the dog barks."*

It is always possible to force a proposition to assume the logical form of two terms and a copula. The first two of the examples are in that form already, and the last becomes "the dog is a barking animal." But this form, though convenient in the management of trains of reasoning and permissible in order to secure clearness in working out a complicated argument, does not rightly represent our ordinary thinking. The form "the dog is a barking animal" (or "an animal that barks") may be the logical equivalent of "the dog barks," but this is the

* Ladd's *Psychology*, Descriptive and Explanatory, Chap. xix; Sully's *The Human Mind*, Chap. xii, § 4.

most that can be said. They are not psychologically equivalent.*

2. *Verbal and Real Predication.* (a) *Kinds of Terms.*

It will now be necessary to examine somewhat closely the nature of the various terms which are used in propositions. First, we are to understand that a term may consist of a single word or of many. In the proposition "birds fly," the subject is a single word; in the proposition "large birds with black spots on the tips of their wings fly," the subject is the many-worded term "large birds with white spots on the tips of their wings." The first division of terms usually noticed is that into singular terms, which can be applied in the same sense to but a single thing; general terms, which apply to a whole group of objects; and collective terms, which apply to a number of individuals when taken together and treated as a whole. A singular term refers to some individual object; the

Singular,
general and
collective.

*Professor Minto says, "When a man says 'P struck Q' he has not necessarily a class of 'strikers of Q' definitely in his mind. What he has in his mind is the logical equivalent of this, but it is not this directly."

general term applies equally to each individual of a group, that is, it is used of the individuals distributively; the collective name does not belong to the separate parts but to the whole. "The court house on the hill," "the Duke of Wellington," "justice," are singular terms. The name "man" is a general term, as it belongs to each and every individual of a class. Regiment, congregation, grove, applied to a whole group and not to the individuals are collective. A term is called abstract when it refers to some

**Abstract
and
concrete.** object which cannot be perceived through the senses, as "sweetness," "justice." The terms "a snowball,"

"a tall man," on the other hand, are concrete.

They refer to objects which may be so perceived. Positive terms express the

**Positive
and
negative.** existence of some quality, as "happy," "good." Negative terms express the

absence of qualities in some object, as "unhappy," "bad." Positive and negative terms are mutually contradictory. Cold and hot, high and low, are

**Relative
and
absolute.** contrary or opposite, but not contradictory. Relative terms are to be distinguished from absolute. The

latter have an intelligible meaning when taken

alone, as tree, house, James. The former usually go in pairs, as father, child; teacher, pupil; etc., and are called correlatives. A relative term has no meaning apart from its correlative.

(b) Use of Terms.

With this brief sketch of the nature of the various kinds of terms which we employ in expressing thought, we go on to notice two different purposes for which terms are employed.

**Extension
or denota-
tion; and in-
tension or
connotation.**

It is usual to distinguish the extension or denotation of a term from its intension or connotation. By this is meant that a term may be applied to a number of individuals on the one hand while it implies certain qualities or attributes on the other. Words are thus used to describe as well as to name and identify things. The term "man" does more than merely refer to different individuals, as John, William, Mary, and to different classes of men, as Australians, Canadians, Africanders. It is more than a bare mark for purpose of identification. It represents as well the qualities or characteristics possessed by the things to which it refers. It implies that the individuals possess certain attributes, reason

and power of speech among others. A term, then, that is clearly understood is a connecting link between certain things and certain attributes. The term "metal" thus connects certain attributes, simplicity, lustre, the power of conducting heat and electricity, with certain individuals, gold, iron, copper, and some others. To possess full and complete knowledge of the whole meaning of a term we must understand both what it implies and what it denotes.

In any series the successive items of which are related as genus and species, we may observe the fact which has led to the enunciation of the mathematical formula that intension and extension of terms vary inversely. The series animal, man, civilized man, Caucasian, John Smith, may be taken to illustrate what is meant by this supposed law. The intension or connotation of the term "civilized man" while it is greater than that of "man" and still greater than that of "animal," is less than that of "Caucasian" and still less than that of "John Smith." On the other hand the term "civilized man" obviously refers to a smaller number of individuals than "animal" or "man" and to a larger number than the others. Certainly the two facts of denota-

tion and connotation appear to be reciprocally opposed. It is enough, however, to notice this without assuming any exact ratio between increase or decrease of denotation and the corresponding change in connotation. The point of special interest to the student of grammar is the effect of the use of qualifiers upon the connotation of a given term.

**Qualifiers
and
connotation.**

It may be added that terms are never used merely to denote or merely to connote. Both purposes are served even though one or other may be more prominent. Every term gives us some information about the qualities of the object which it is used to identify.*

If we wish to define a term we may do so either by giving an account of what it denotes or by telling what it implies or connotes. The term "island" may be defined by giving the names of a number of the objects to which the word applies: Newfoundland, Malta, Ceylon, Cuba. The meaning of the term statesman may be given

*Mill says that proper names are not connotative, that "when we name a child by the name of Paul, or a dog by the name of Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse." Logic, Chapter 2, § 5. For a discussion of this point see Jevon's Elements of Logic, Section iii, § 6.

in extension by enumerating the Marquis of Salisbury, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Mr. McKinley. Science, in extension includes Chemistry, Physiology, Astronomy, etc. It is customary, however, to proceed by way of connotation, that is, we define the term "island" as a piece of land entirely surrounded by water; "statesman" as a man of distinction in national and political affairs; "science" as organized or systematic knowledge.

(c) Import of Propositions.

We are now in a position to see clearly the important distinction between verbal and real propositions. When we have laid down a definition by connotation we may go on and deduce from it certain items which though not explicitly set forth may be shown to be logically implied. This process, it is to be remembered, is purely one of formal reasoning, and does not in any way involve reference to facts of denotation. A proposition which sets forth something either explicitly mentioned in the definition of a term, or deduced therefrom by a clear process of inference is an arbitrary or verbal proposition. Statements of truths of pure mathematics, and definitions of terms employed in any department

of thought, together with all legitimate deductions therefrom are in this view of the case considered as merely verbal propositions.

We may examine a few cases. A triangle is a three sided figure, justice is giving to all their due, Homer wrote the Iliad, instinct is untaught

**Examples
of verbal
predication.** ability, conscience possesses authority over men's actions, matter is inert, uninteresting sensations are never for their own sake an object of attention, sovereignty is the authority of one or more men over others, a house is made to dwell in, mind is intelligent, fire burns.

A little reflection is necessary to see why these are called arbitrary or verbal propositions. In each case we discover that we have a notion "under the guise of a proposition." If we know the meaning of the terms "triangle" and "justice," in the first instances, the propositions do not put us any further ahead than we were before. They simply unfold the meaning of the term. The affirmation regarding Homer is simply that the name of the author of the Iliad was Homer. At best, the phrase, "untaught ability" in the fourth example does not do any more than render more distinct the meaning

of "instinct." "Authority" is found on examination to be part of the connotation of "conscience." "Inert" simply mentions the essential quality of matter. The next proposition amounts to no more than this: that uninteresting sensations do not interest us. The eighth example is a definition. The ninth gives us part of the meaning of "house." "Intelligent" repeats what is included in everyone's idea of mind. In the last example the predicate "burns" unfolds the chief attribute of the subject "fire."*

On the other hand, where the predicate is a positive addition to the subject, and neither directly nor indirectly contained in it, the proposition is said to be a real proposition.

Gold is found in California, the mountain is covered with snow, John enjoys good health, Socrates knows grammar, silver is not legal tender, Manitoba grows the best wheat in the world,—these are examples of propositions in

which the predicate is not merely a reading out of what is logically expressed or implied by the subject. They are examples of real predication. We

**Examples
of real
predication.**

* These instances are taken from Bain's Logic, Chap. II.

have here not merely the form, but also the reality of predication. No analysis of the idea of gold will ever yield the predicate "found in California." "Found in California" forms no part of the connotation of the term "gold." The logicians would speak of this predicate, and of the other predicates,—“covered with snow,” “enjoys good health,” “knows grammar,” etc., as Accidents or Concomitants, that is, they neither belong to the connotation of the subject nor can be deduced from the same.

It is sometimes stated that in the act of judgment which gives rise to a proposition we have first a concept corresponding to the subject and then another concept corresponding to the predicate, and that somehow or other we discern a relation between them. This seems to be indicated by the fact that in the proposition we find words necessarily succeeding each other, first the subject, so-called, and then the predicate, so-called. We have seen, however, that this is not what takes place in the case of the verbal proposition, and later on we shall see that it is not true of the real proposition either. We have seen that the predicate of a verbal proposi-

**Relation
between no-
tions in the
judgment.**


tion is simply a reading out of some item belonging to the idea expressed by the subject, that such propositions do nothing more for us than set forth explicitly something already implied by the word, that anyone who knows the meaning of the terms, "snow," "ball," "body," in the propositions, "snow is cold," "the ball is round," "all bodies are extended," recognizes the predicate as an inseparable part of the subject.

A verbal proposition, then, is a mere unfolding of all or part of the conventional meaning of a term. We shall find, on examination, that

Relation of notions in verbal predication. a real proposition is merely the unfolding of what is contained in some whole or complex before the mind of the person speaking. The mental process of judging which issues in a verbal proposition is the same in kind with that which is expressed in a real one. Judgments all conform to the type known as analytic-synthetic; that is to say, they are in their nature at once analytic and synthetic. Analysis may be the main purpose in certain cases, and synthesis the main purpose in others; but analysis and synthesis are present in every judgment. In all cases

the process of judging—a process beginning in analysis—supposes the presence, in the mind, of some complex idea, some whole awaiting this process. It does not matter whether the idea is that of some concrete object present to the sense, or of some absent one, or of an abstraction. In every case some phase or feature of the whole presentation is selected as predicate, and the proposition appears: “the mountain is covered with snow,” “the sun set in a bank of cloud,” “his conduct deserves praise.”


The process which issues in a predication may be illustrated by a diagram, and this diagram will serve also to exhibit the relation between the notion and the judgment. We may take first the idea of a concrete object either before the mind's eye or present to sense.



very broad—
 2,000 feet high—rugged
 here and there—partially
 wooded—traversed by several roads
COVERED WITH SNOW—
 beautiful—clear-cut outline—bright
 with the sunshine—railway
 track near the base—
 tunnelled,
 etc.

The idea is that of a mountain, and the phase or feature which emerges into greatest prominence as we consider the mental image or the concrete object before us is that it is covered

with snow. The other features which successively present themselves are possible predicates, but in this instance we may suppose that the diagram represents what comes prominently before the mind. The proposition, "The mountain is covered with snow," formally expresses the act of judgment.



born 469 B.C.
—went about asking
questions—a great teacher—a good man—believed
himself guided by an inner voice.

AN ATHENIAN.
wife's name Xantippe — fought
at Delium — condemned
to death for his
teachings,
etc.

The proposition, "Socrates was an Athenian," may be similarly illustrated as setting forth the result of a mental process in which the predicate, Athenian, is chosen from among

the ideas which successively make their appearance in consciousness.

Again, the proposition, "Gold is found in California," is the result of a thought process, which may be represented as in the third diagram. The words printed in italics here represent those items which are included in the conventional meaning or connotation of the term gold. Any of these used as predicates go to the formation of verbal propositions. It is not

pretended, of course, that these diagrams represent what arises in consciousness in every case. But they represent what may arise when the meaning of a term is reflected upon. We must

used for
ornaments—used as a
medium of exchange—the
standard in some countries—
taken from mines—taken from rivers

FOUND IN CALIFORNIA.

found in Australia—found in Yukon—
used in the arts — *an elementary
substance — possesses a certain lus-
tre — will conduct heat and
electricity — specific gravity
19.3 — yellow in colour
—very ductile, etc.,
etc.*

bear in mind that, in thinking, we recall only so much of the thought process indicated by a given word as is necessary for the purpose we have in hand at the time.

The whole meaning

of the word does not come before the mind every time it is uttered. Very often the only part of the meaning which comes vividly before us is that which is predicated, all the rest remaining vague and indistinct.

3. The Relation of Subject and Predicate.

We are now in a position to understand fully the relation of subject and predicate in the proposition as considered from the standpoint of grammar. We have already noticed the fact that terms may be interpreted in two ways: as denoting individuals, or classes, and as im-

plying qualities or attributes. It is in the former way that the proposition is interpreted by the logician: that is, the subject and predicate are regarded as denoting objects or classes of objects. In this view of the case all propositions are regarded as reducible to the type which affirms (or denies) the inclusion of one class of objects in another class. The proposition "all good men are patriots" is taken as asserting that good men are included in the class of patriots; and on the other hand, in the proposition "no fixed stars are planets," the classes "fixed stars" and "planets" are regarded as mutually exclusive. The proposition "the dog barks" presents a slight difficulty, but becomes "the dog is a barking animal," thus conforming to the type consisting of two terms and a copula, so that the distribution of terms may be readily understood. This method of reading propositions is found to be very convenient in making clear the relation of terms and propositions in complicated chains of reasoning. The logician reduces propositions to this type not because he considers that the type suggests the right theory of the nature of judgment, but simply because it is a

As viewed
by the
logician.

convenient form for the management of arguments and the detection of fallacies.

Grammar, however, does not concern itself with the correctness or incorrectness of the conclusions reached in a train of reasoning. It deals with the relation of one proposition to another only to the extent of classifying the connectives employed to indicate such relations. It attempts to understand the nature of the judgment as expressed in a proposition, and the true relation of its elements.

As viewed
by the
grammarian.

We shall see presently that a less artificial way of interpreting propositions is by reference to connotation rather than by denotation, and that grammar adopts this natural method of reading them. Thus the proposition "all good men are patriots" implies that the quality of being a patriot is united with the other attributes connoted by the term "good men." The position taken is that the grammatical relation of subject and predicate can be understood only from the point of view of connotation. We shall find that the predicate always forms some part of the connotation of the subject. That is to say, the

predicate is an attribute: it qualifies the subject.*

From what has been said, the relation of subject and predicate in any proposition is evident. The predicate, as it expresses some element or feature singled out in thought from the complex before the mind of the speaker, always serves as an attribute whose function is to qualify or limit the term used as subject. In order to have a clear idea of this and of certain other grammatical relations, we must keep clearly in view the use of terms in connotation.

Our first analysis of the sentence will correspond to an analysis of the judgment, and will result in a division into subject and predicate, or if the sign of connection is present, subject, copula, and predicate. When we analyze a few sentences we find that the subject consists some-

The connection between qualifiers and connotation.

* See "Mind," Oct., 1898, "The Psychology of Deductive Logic," by Margaret Washburn: "Except where the judgment is the conclusion of a syllogism the use of the copula is always repeats the emergence into greater clearness of one of the elements in a complex mental state."

"The fundamental process of mind involved in judgment would seem to be the process by which in a complex conscious state, a certain element is fixed upon, analyzed out, by the attention, and thus given a greater clearness in consciousness than it had before."

times of a single word, sometimes of many. The sentence may be, Birds are beautiful: or it may be, Large white birds with black spots on the tips of their wings are beautiful. The subject of the first sentence is "birds," a simple subject. That of the second is "large-white-birds-with-black-spots-on-the-tips-of-their-wings," a subject obviously not simple. Analysis shows that such terms consist of a primary or principal word along with its qualifiers. Here, as in the case of the relation of the subject and predicate, we shall see the connection between qualifiers and connotation. It has already been pointed out that a term is a connecting link between certain things and certain attributes. The simple term "birds" and the compound term similarly perform this duty. We see at a glance that the term "birds" includes a larger number of things and implies a smaller number of attributes, than the longer term, that is to say, it connotes less and denotes more. To qualify a term is to effect a change in its connotation.

The
predicate
a qualifier.

The relation, then, between the whole subject and the predicate is much the same as that between a bare or simple subject and the other words or

phrases which go to make up the whole or logical subject. It is true that the phrase "the red house" is not quite the equivalent of "the house is red." The phrase is no doubt the expression of a judgment, a judgment the elements of which are very intimately associated. The proposition explicitly sets forth an element or phase or feature which the phrase connotes. The difference, however, between the phrase and the proposition, whatever it is, does not affect the relation of the word "red." It is a qualifier, no matter what its geographical position in the sentence may be.

At this point we may review the ground we have gone over and gather up the results. Our examination of the proposition thus
Summary. far has resulted in the discovery of two principal parts, subject and predicate. The part which stands out as the essential feature is the predicate. It is the predicate which distinguishes the proposition from the mere phrase. Its function as predicate is to qualify the subject. The whole of the predicate is attributive to the whole of the subject. Within the subject, if the subject is a many worded term, we find a bare subject and a qualifier or

qualifiers. The term substantive will serve to indicate the bare subject. A group of words with a unity of its own often appears as qualifier, which group is called a phrase.

We have then the proposition consisting in every case of a substantive and an attribute or attributes. The articulation of these various portions of the proposition is by means of words which may for the present receive the general name of connectives. Under these general names, substantives, attributives, and connectives, we shall be able to collect all the various kinds of words which are employed in a sentence.

4. The Grammar of the Judgment and the Grammar of the Notion.

It was stated at the outset that this survey of the field of elementary grammar should include the relation of the elements of the sentence as well as the nature of the sentence itself. Logically the detailed study of the notion, as distinct from the judgment, is a chapter of grammar which belongs to a later stage of progress. This study of the notion—that is to say, the study of the word apart from its function in

the sentence, and merely as the expression of a notion—forms a large part of the material of school texts at present, but should be left over to the period of the high school. Before that department of grammatical study is entered, the whole energy of the student should be devoted to mastering the grammar of the judgment. Confusion is sure to arise in his mind unless the two are kept separate and distinct; and the proposal to leave the study of the notion over to the later period is in complete accord with the principles of the science of teaching.

In the propositions: John took a skiff; A lady accompanied him, They were very happy;

it is clear that the words *John*, *lady*,
Functional and notional value of words. and *they* perform precisely the same sentence function, just as a roof may

be of shingles, or of straw, or of slate, and yet keep out the rain. The distinction between singular and class names, and between proper names and pronouns, belongs to the grammar of the notion. Here the sentence function is the same; the notions are different. The words *fiercely* and *bones* in the propositions: "The lion roars fiercely" and "The dog gnaws bones," each perform the duty of secondary at-

tributives. Considered in their notional aspect they are different.

The grammar of the notion is no less a part of logic than the grammar of the judgment. It is, in fact, but another stage of logical study, and furnishes ample exercise for the student in the processes of classification

The field and definition. The chief thing is of each. to distinguish the proper field of each, and assign to each its place on the programme We may say briefly that while the grammar of the judgment gives us an account of the nature of predication and the relation of the elements of the sentence, thus dealing with the judgment as a whole, the grammar of the notion proceeds to a detailed study of the elements and exhibits the methodical classification of substantives and attributives. The classification of connectives belongs to the study of the judgment, since the basis of classification must be sentence function. A connective must either join judgments, or parts of judgments, to each other.

This higher study of the notion as distinct from the judgment must not be confused with that study of the notion which at the outset

(see page 22) was necessary in the clear understanding of the relation existing between the formal judgment and its elementary notions. Such a study of the notion was absolutely essential to the right understanding of the nature of the judgment and of predication.

SECTION II.
METHOD.

CHAPTER II.

I.—EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF GRAMMAR.

1. Relation to Logic.

It is now generally agreed that a knowledge of the science of grammar is no guarantee that one shall speak the language with propriety. "Correct" English is spoken by those who habitually hear and read good English. This being the case, the question at once arises as to the value of the study. If the best way to acquire habits of correct and graceful speech is by consorting with good speakers and well-written books; if the time to be spent in the study of grammar is out of all proportion to the improvement we may hope to make thereby in speaking and writing;* if grammar is chiefly useful as an introduction to logic—a science whose prac-

* "We cannot perceive that the study of grammar makes the smallest difference in the speech of people who have always lived in good society. Not one Londoner in ten thousand can lay down the rules for the proper use of *will* and *shall*. Yet not one Londoner in a million ever misplaces his *will* and *shall*. Dr. Robertson could, undoubtedly, have written a luminous dissertation on the use of those words. Yet, even in his latest work, he sometimes misplaced them ludicrously."—*Lord Macaulay: Essay on Bacon.*

tical utility is not by any means beyond suspicion—what inducement is there to go into the study of grammar at all?

It is of course no sufficient answer to this question to say that there may be good reasons for engaging in the study of a given subject other than a consideration of the practical advantages to be derived therefrom. Nevertheless, the student hardly goes the right way to work whose attitude towards the subject he undertakes is expressed by the question, "How can I most quickly turn these matters to the service of my personal interest and advantage?" Such is not the attitude of the true student. The desire of knowledge for its own sake is a sufficient motive. However, the claims of grammar as a school study rest upon the same ground as those of logic. If there are any practical advantages to be claimed for the study of logic, such advantages are also claimed for grammar; though of course the field of the latter science is not so extensive as that of the former.

2. Practical Advantages of Logic.

That the study of logic has its practical advantages is clear when we consider the fact that one's thoughts and opinions upon life in

general and upon the "practical" affairs of life in particular are largely determined by the principle or theory which guides him in deciding what is true and what is false. A man may never have reflected upon the method by which he reached a certain decision, may be quite unable to state the principle upon which his conduct or opinion is based, but that does not alter the fact that there is method in his thought and a standard of truth on which he relies. Whether conscious of it or not, he cannot avoid thinking and acting according to some theory or other. It will hardly be denied that for "practical" purposes the man who has some idea of the structure of knowledge and the conditions of proof is less likely to go astray than one whose guiding principles are mere assumptions which have been unconsciously adopted and never examined.

3. *The Aim of Grammar.*

The course of study indicated in the preceding chapter will, if properly carried out, vindicate the claim of grammar to be regarded as an introduction to logic. It has just been pointed out that the province of logic is much more extensive

The respective spheres of grammar and logic.

than that of grammar. A very large section, for example, deals with the various methods of eliminating the cause of a phenomenon from the neutral or indifferent accompaniments. With this, as with the whole question of figures and canons of the syllogism, grammar has nothing to do. It should, however, enable one to understand something of the nature of the judgment and the proposition in which it issues, and the relation of its elements. It should deal with the various kinds of terms employed in expressing thought. It should exhibit the distinction between verbal and real predication. It should give the student some familiarity with those important operations in the discovery and verification of knowledge known as definition, classification and division. It should furnish him with practice in the art of classification, and have the double result of knowledge of theory combined with the practical skill. It should secure in like manner, that is, by actual practice in defining terms, adequate knowledge of the rules or canons for the intelligent criticism of all definitions. In short, grammar aims at the formation of clear and distinct ideas by means of the accurate definition of the terms

employed in distinguishing the various elements of a proposition and expressing their relations to each other. Logic enables us to criticise propositions, to understand the conditions of proof, to distinguish between real and imaginary knowledge; and in so far as grammar by the study of the proposition or sentence results in clear ideas regarding the structure of knowledge, it prepares the way for logic and so justifies the claim made for it, that it should be considered as introductory to the wider field.

II.—GRAMMAR AN INDUCTIVE SCIENCE.

1. *The Teacher's Chief Maxim.*

The maxim of principal importance for the teacher of grammar to keep in mind is that the work of classification and definition is to be done by the pupil, and not for him. The teacher who fails to observe this in his dealings with his pupils fails utterly. Let us suppose that neglecting this reasonable and obvious principle the teacher should follow a course too often followed in the past, and place before his class a list of definitions of terms to be memorized, along with illustrative examples. In such a case what

Work to be
done by the
pupil, not
for him.

training does the pupil get? He certainly loses that which grammar is especially calculated to furnish, namely, that furnished by exercises in classification and definition. The work which he ought to do has been done for him by someone else, and the only part which he plays in the matter is to commit to memory the results of the thinking of someone else. This is to reverse the natural arrangement. True progress can be made only when regard is paid to the nature of the subject. Grammar is an inductive science. The pupil can gain progress and profit just to whatever extent it is treated as an inductive science, and it is a waste of time to treat it in any other way.

2. How Not to Do It.

If this principle is clearly recognized in all the work of teaching grammar, the pupil may expect to reap whatever advantages attach to the prosecution of an inductive science. If there is anything to be gained by practice in observing, comparing, discovering points of similarity and difference, generalizing, defining, the scientific study of grammar offers that advantage. If the principle is not clearly recognized by the teacher, and acted on in his teaching, nine-

tenths of the advantages of grammatical study will be lost to the pupil. To treat grammar as a deductive science, that is, to lay down general statements and rules for the student to

The mediæ-val idea of grammatical study. learn and then supply him with illustrative concrete cases, is to pursue the mediæval idea of grammatical study.

By supplying the pupil with cut and dried classifications and definitions the teacher robs him of the advantages of the only part of the work which could do him any real good, namely, those accompanying the mental process by which these results were reached. And this is true no matter how accurate the statements of the text book may be. It would undoubtedly be better for the pupil to discover results for himself, and make an attempt to set forth his discoveries in language of his own, even though his results were incorrect and his language clumsy, than that he should passively accept the accurately stated conclusions of someone else.

III.—MENTAL PROCESSES.

1. Observation.

It has already been pointed out, and the importance of the fact has perhaps been suffi-

ciently emphasized, that in the scientific study of grammar the sentence is to be taken as the unit. Here the work of observation properly begins. The pupil's task is evidently to examine the proposition, or rather to examine propositions with classification ultimately in view. He will examine the sentences for himself. The teacher's work will consist very largely in supplying him with necessary materials upon which to exercise his powers; the pupil's work will consist in observing and comparing the phenomena of language thus placed before him. It is not by talking about propositions in general that the teacher will most effectively do his work, but by placing propositions before the pupil for observation and comparison. Such observation, we must not fail to notice, is not an affair of sense perception as is the

**Grammar
and Botany
compared.**

case with a science like Botany, for example. The materials with which the student of Botany deals are plants; and it is the colour, form, texture, and such qualities as are directly perceived by the senses that the botanist observes. It may very well be that what is called observation in such cases is made up in great part of inference from

sense ; nevertheless the purpose is to employ the power of sense perception, and we are constantly warned of the danger of confounding what we infer with what we actually observe. In thus assigning to sense perception its necessary function in such sciences as Botany, we must not lose sight of the part played by the mind itself. Facts cannot be gathered by the sense organs alone. Observation in the study of Botany is a good deal more than merely staring at plants. It involves conscious analysis and choice, discrimination and selection of particular features.

What is true of the student of Botany and allied sciences regarding the work of the sense organs,—that it is largely supplemented by the activity of thought—is true also, and applies with even greater force, of the student of grammar. The eye, or the ear, is called into play in examining language, but it is only in so far as we are able to reproduce in consciousness the thought processes which the language is intended to express that we can make any

What to observe. progress in grammar whatever. We are to observe the meaning behind the symbols rather than the symbols themselves. Observation in the science of grammar is of

thought processes, not of physical forms. Grammar is a branch of mental not of physical science.

It is when this feature of grammatical study is recognized that the teacher is in danger of going astray. The subject matter of the science is different in nature from anything that the student has yet undertaken to examine scientifically. This is the first time he has been required to examine and deal with the phenomena of mental life. He is called upon to do

<p>The first attempt at introspection.</p>	<p>a certain amount of introspection. He must reproduce in his own mind the mental processes expressed in the sentence forms which he is engaged in studying. If he does not succeed in thus making his own thought processes the object of attention, he cannot make any progress in grammar. To do this requires effort and a new attitude of mind on his part. If at this stage the teacher is tempted to adopt the cheap and easy substitute of having the pupil memorize the results of other people's thinking, in the vain hope that some day these results may have some meaning for him and prove of some use to him, the advantage that the study of grammar has to offer will thus be deliberately thrown away.</p>
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2. Definition.

Instead, however, of resorting to the mediæval plan of placing before the pupils a definition couched in unexceptionable language, with instructions to store it away in the lumber-room of memory in some convenient corner whence it can be dragged forth when called for, the teacher will take the necessary steps to build up in their minds a clear and adequate idea of what the term sentence really stands for; and this can be accomplished only by the examination and comparison of actual sentences, work done by the pupils themselves. Already there has grown up in their minds a more or less vague notion of what the term signifies. They have used the word and heard it used for many years. It is in all probability associated in their minds with what appears on a page between two full stops; or it is a collection of words which begins with a capital letter; or perhaps it is a "full answer" to a question from the teacher. This is a good enough working idea for all the purposes of the young pupil, but the time has come when the idea of a sentence must contain a good deal more than that. It must be made to include more, and it must be made more

definite. It must be defined by reference to what it expresses. As a result of the pupils' examination of concrete cases they may be brought to see that the term sentence means something like this: a collection of words by means of which something is said of an object or individual. Once more, let it be kept clearly in mind that it is not the definition itself that is chiefly of value, but the processes by which the definition is reached, that the soul does not grow and wax strong by swallowing at great gulps the results of another's thinking*

How a clear
idea is to
be reached.

Children cannot be excelled in their talent for discovering and applying rules of thumb. In

* A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of that nature of the thing defined: but let the virtue of a definition be what it will, in the order of things, it seems rather to follow than to precede our enquiry, of which it ought to be considered the result. It must be acknowledged that the methods of disquisition and teaching may be sometimes different, and on very good reason, undoubtedly; but for my part, I am convinced that the method of teaching which approaches most nearly to the method of investigation is incomparably the best; since not content with serving up a few barren and lifeless truths, it leads to the stock on which they grew; it tends to set the reader himself in the track of invention, and to direct him into those paths in which the author has made his own discoveries, if he should be so happy as to have made any that are valuable,"—*Edmund Burke: "Essay on Taste."*

the absence of scientific teaching they find themselves obliged to exercise their ingenuity in order to reach the required results. As in past times patients got better in spite of nostrums and bad nursing, so no amount of pedantry on the teacher's part can ever completely begot and mislead the human intellect. If the attention of the pupil is not directed to the true character of the sentence as the expression of a judgment, he will now call to his assistance some mechanical and easily applied test which shall serve as a rough and ready means of deliverance in the hour of grammar.

**Mechanical
rules and
ear marks.**

It may be the presence of some well-known mark, like *is* or *are*, or a word denoting action, and the absence of certain connectives, as *and*, *but*, *or*, etc. These are generally safe indications, and the pupil learns to be guided by them. He will be all the more likely to be guided by these purely formal and mechanical rules of thumb, if his progress in learning to read has been retarded by unskillful teaching. If in that process the words, and only the words, have been made the object of attention, and if the thoughts underlying the words have been neglected, it is altogether probable

that the subject of grammar will be treated by him in similar fashion. As in the process of learning to read he has not got down below the words to their meaning, so in grammar he will not get past the collection of words to the judgment from which they sprang. He will concentrate his attention upon forms, and as he has hit upon some system of ear-marks by which to distinguish the sentence from other forms, and the parts thereof from each other, he will fail to reach the thought process of which it is, and must be regarded as, the expression.

On the other hand, the pupil whose reading is habitually an attempt to get thought from

Scientific
teaching of
reading is
the best pre-
paration for
grammar.

the written or printed page, and to express that thought orally, should have little difficulty in grasping the real nature of the sentence. It is true that up to the present time he has not been required to examine the nature of language. But he has used language quite naturally as the expression of thought in his ordinary experience, and if his school life has not been more than usually artificial, thought and language have preserved the same relation there. When he begins the study of grammar his mental

attitude must change slightly. This relation between thought and language, between the judgment and the proposition, he must now become conscious of. He must make his own mental processes the object of attention and make his first serious attempt at introspection. Rational teaching of reading is direct preparation for a right understanding of the concepts of grammar when the stage of grammar arrives. The pupil who has acquired the habit of looking upon the words of a narrative as expressing some thought which he must grasp and make his own, before he can read it aloud for the benefit of others, is receiving the best of all possible training for the study of this type of all intellection, the judgment.

We may here turn aside for a moment to describe in detail the nature of the preparation for the study of grammar provided by the subject of reading rationally taught. The first exercise in reading, that is, the expression of thought, is in the form of a judgment. Let us briefly consider in the first place the previous preparation which the child has received in order to put him in a position to make the

**How reading
prepares for
grammar.**

necessary thought analysis of that judgment, which must be made before he can express it. To revert to what has been said in a previous paragraph, the formal judgment, or the "story," as it is called in the reading lesson, belongs to a later psychological stage than the notions from the comparison of which it has resulted. He has been made familiar with the written forms corresponding with these notions, and is now in a position to deal with the judgment as symbolized in the written story. What are the steps involved in the analysis of this symbolized

**Steps in the
process of
interpreting
written
forms.**

judgment which must be taken before he can interpret it, that is, read it? He must recognize it as a whole, as a complex made up of simpler elements, these elements being notions. Second, he must perform the necessary imaging act; that is, he must image that which is back of the words. Next, he must establish a thought relation between these notions. His first step, therefore, was the analysis of the judgment into its component notions. This step is absolutely essential to the interpretation, that is, to the reading of the judgment. Hence, it is not enough to say that a child, while performing that analytic

process which must take place before any sentence can be intelligently read, is employed in an exercise similar to that in which the student of grammar engages when he begins the formal analysis of a sentence into subject and predicate. The exercises are more than similar; they are identical. In reading, this analysis, while essential, is incidental; in the study of grammar it becomes the chief thing.

It must be borne in mind that there are two features involved in this work of framing definitions. There is first the discovery of the meaning, and afterwards the expression of the meaning. We must know something of the best method of reaching clear ideas, and something of the best method of stating in language the results we have reached. As regards the

**Ideas must
be reached
and then
expressed.**

first requirement, since definition (intensive) has to do with fixing the precise connotation of names, a complete definition can only be reached after a full examination of representative instances of the individual thing under consideration. It is also an effective plan in discovering the essential features of a given species to contrast it with some opposed or negative idea.

This is called by Bain the negative method, the principle or canon of which is stated thus—“Assemble for comparison the particulars of the opposed or contrasting notion.” The canon of the positive method is “Assemble for comparison the particulars coming under the notion to be defined.”

The essential feature in the process of reaching a general idea is expressed by the word generalization, which consists in discovering similarity in the midst of diversity. In the

Positive method.	instance under consideration we discover from the examination of a large number of differing instances that the point of similarity or community among sentences is that of attributing some quality, condition or action to an object or individual. This is the result which the pupil should reach after examining the instances placed before him, though of course it is extremely improbable that he should state his results in these words; and it is absolutely certain that the wise teacher will not at this stage furnish him with words. He will content himself with setting his pupils at work comparing sentences and noting their agreement. It is enough if he succeed, by means
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of intelligent direction of their thoughts, through questions that shall not be too suggestive, in inducing them to do this work for themselves. It will be necessary to direct their thoughts by means of questions in order that time and effort shall not be spent in aimless guessing. But the chief danger for the teacher to avoid is the common one of doing too much for the pupil. The temptation is to "help" the pupil rapidly over the ground that he ought to traverse for himself. A little reflection should show the teacher that there is no such great hurry to get over the ground after all, that the important thing to keep in view is that the pupil shall be allowed to exercise his own powers in making the journey.

The canon of the negative method is that the process of generalization should be employed to define the opposing or contrasted notion. It is desirable in order to bring to the greatest possible clearness the nature of the idea we are trying to define that we should distinguish it from the "phrase." The mere phrase may be the expression of an idea very similar to that expressed by the proposition. Nevertheless, it does not predicate

**Negative
method.**

anything of an individual or object. A number of phrases like "the red rose," "the tall man," "a barking dog," "the little old house by the river," should be examined and contrasted with propositions like "the rose is red," "the man is tall," etc.

So much for the discovery of the meaning. The other feature in definition is that of expressing this meaning in language. We have now

**Expressing
the meaning
in language.** to examine the conditions which a logical definition must fulfil. The text books on logic usually give five

rules for definition, but in order to understand them we must first notice certain terms which are employed in stating them, namely,

**Genus,
species, and
difference.** genus, species, and difference. Any term may be regarded as a *genus* which includes two or more subor-

ordinate classes, and such subordinate classes are said to be species in relation to the larger class which has thus been subdivided. Again, a term may be regarded as a *species* in relation to some larger class of which it is a part, or as a genus in relation to smaller classes which it includes. "Man" is thus considered as a species of the genus "animal," and may

at the same time be regarded as a genus comprising various species of men—white, black, yellow, etc. The *difference* is the surplus of the connotation of the species over the genus. The term man connotes all that is connoted by the term animal plus something more. This something more is known in logic as the difference.

The first requirement of a logical definition is that it should state the essential attributes of the thing defined. Instead, however, of giving an exhaustive account in detail of all the attributes connoted by the term, we assume that the genus is already sufficiently well understood, and hence the species is defined by giving the next or proximate genus and the difference specifically stated. Briefly, the species equals the genus together with the specific difference. Thus we define the term triangle as a rectilinear figure (genus) having three sides (difference); man as an animal (genus) endowed with speech and reason (difference); ethics as the science (genus) of men's duties (difference); sentence as the expression (genus) of a judgment (difference), or as a collection of words (genus) in

Require-
ments of a
logical
definition.

which some quality or action is attributed to an individual or object (difference). The second requirement is that the definition should not contain the name defined, nor any word which is directly synonymous, with it. "Life is the sum of vital processes," "justice is doing justly," are examples usually quoted as violating this rule. The definition should be exactly equivalent to the class of objects defined, that is, it must be neither too broad nor too narrow. For example, when a triangle is defined as "a rectilinear figure with three equal sides and angles," we have really explained a species of triangles, and such definition is too narrow. We go to the opposite extreme in defining words as "the signs of thoughts." There are other signs also. A definition should not be expressed in obscure, figurative, or ambiguous language. Clearness being the end of definition, we see at once the reason for this rule. Finally, a definition should, wherever possible, be affirmative rather than negative.*

It has been thought desirable thus to trace somewhat in detail the steps to be taken in

* See Thomson's "Outline of the Laws of Thought"; Jevon's "Elements of Logic," etc.

reaching a definition of a term. Such procedure should be supplemented by a careful criticism, under direction and guidance of the teacher, of all definitions that are offered until a suitable one is reached. The teacher will of course bear

The process rather than the result. in mind that the chief value of the whole exercise consists not in the result but in the process by which that result is reached. The mere statement in words of the meaning of the term is a small matter: the important thing is the mental process and the resultant training in discrimination, comparison and generalization. Criticism of faulty definitions and the construction of better ones will very shortly serve to make students acquainted—in a practical way, and not merely as a matter of theory—with the rules governing the formation of definitions.

But we have not yet done with the meaning of the term we set out to examine. A term is a connecting link between attributes or qualities and objects or classes of objects.

Intensive and extensive definition.

Hence we may define a term in either of two ways, or rather we shall realize its whole meaning when we have defined it in both of these ways. We may give

a systematic account of the qualities implied or connoted by the term. This is the method which has been described in the preceding paragraph, and which is known as intensive definition. On the other hand, we may give a systematic account of the various objects or individuals to which the term may be applied. The process known as Division is the method of defining a term from the point of view of extension. It is better known by the less formal name of Classification.

In order, then, to a thorough understanding of what is meant by a sentence, the pupil must proceed to discover the various classes belonging under that term. At the risk of tedious repetition we must notice that here is another opportunity for the teacher to go astray. A simple and easy way is apt to suggest itself by which the results sought for may be quickly secured. Why not classify sentences for the pupils, define the groups, give examples, and have the pupils learn it all by heart? The error in such proceeding has been sufficiently condemned already. The teacher's work is properly confined to providing his pupils with necessary materials and seeing to it that they examine,

compare and classify these materials for themselves.

3. *Classification.*

The purpose of classification is the discovery of real likeness in the individuals. Any characteristic may be taken as a basis of classification, but if the point chosen is merely an accidental or surface feature, the resulting division will be artificial and of little scientific value. We might thus divide sentences according to the number of words they contain, or the length of the words. But scientific classification results in grouping the individuals upon some essential principle of relation. We shall seek in vain for the essential point of resemblance among sentences unless we consider the nature of the judgment from which they proceed. We may observe again that it is not so much the sentences that are to be examined as the mental processes which issue in sentences.

The theory of logical division is best learned through actual practice. Certain rules have been framed for the purpose of calling attention to the errors one is most likely to make in the process of division.

Purpose
of classifica-
tion.

Rules
of logical
division.

1. Every division is made on the ground of differences in some attribute or attributes common to all the members of the whole to be divided.

2. Every division must be based on a single principle or ground.

3. The constituent species must not overlap, but must be mutually exclusive.

4. The division must be exhaustive, *i.e.*, the constituent species must be equal when added together, to the genus.

Examples of divisions which violate some of these rules will perhaps make their application clearer than much exposition. To divide mankind into Christians, Mohammedans, Europeans, Americans and Buddhists, would be a violation of the second law, which warns us against changing the basis of division while the process is being carried out. We began with the basis or principle of religion, but did not carry it out. The principle of geographical distribution was then employed, and in its turn dropped for the former one, that of religion. We have in this division violated also the third rule. These species overlap, do not exclude each other. Our

**Examples of
violation of
these rules.**

example violates also the fourth rule. The whole of the class man is not included in this division. The inhabitants of a district are arranged by statisticians in various classes and for various purposes. On the basis of religion we may say that there are so many Jews, Methodists, Roman Catholics, Episcopalians, Unitarians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, etc. Some such division is employed and is usually satisfactory for the purpose in hand. From the standpoint of the rules of logic we see at a glance that the division is not a good one. All Jews are Unitarians; all Roman Catholics, and some Methodists are Episcopalians. Again, the basis is not the same throughout. Unitarians differ from the others in regard to the nature of the Deity, and the distinction between Congregationalists, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians has reference to form of church government. The first rule of logical division simply calls attention to the fact that it is impossible to divide a whole save on the basis of difference in something common to all its parts.

It will be noticed that the terms division and classification are here used interchangeably. As a matter of fact it is somewhat difficult

to distinguish between what might appear to
 be different processes. It is not
 our purpose, nor is it necessary,
 to attempt to disentangle the two.

Classifica-
 tion and
 division.

It is sufficient to say that while classification seems to emphasize the grouping of things on the ground of resemblances, and division appears to emphasize the separation of things on the ground of differences, yet the two are inseparable in fact. To illustrate, in the classification of sentences some quality which belongs to some and not to others in the collection before us is taken as a basis, and the members of the collection possessing that quality are grouped on the ground of resemblance. Yet the very act of fixing the mind upon the aforesaid quality involves or implies a division on the basis of difference.

IV.—OUTLINE OF TOPICS.

I. General Order of Procedure.

It only remains to indicate briefly the order and treatment of topics to be followed in presenting the subject of grammar to the beginner. From what has been said already, the general order proposed will be at once apparent. The

teacher will proceed by way of analysis, that is to say, he will begin with the characteristic unit, the sentence, and examine it as a whole. This study of the sentence as a whole is a necessary preliminary to the study of its constituent parts, and their relation to each other.

2. Examination of Thought Forms.

The first step, then, is to gain a clear knowledge of the sentence. By a clear knowledge is meant such as will enable one to distinguish a sentence from any other group of words or form of expression. The pupil should be required to examine, compare and classify a number of forms of expression, so as to exhibit clearly thereby the essential feature of the sentence, and to set forth the result of his inductions in tolerably clear and concise language.

The question of principal importance for the teacher to consider at this stage is: What exactly are the results it is desired to reach, and what exactly are the mental operations which the pupil must perform before he can reach these results? He will examine the material provided in the next chapter, and such other material as the judicious teacher will deem necessary in

the particular circumstances. The sum total
 to the pupil should be the power
 What to aim at. not only readily and accurately to
 classify the thought forms; but also to state
 in clear language first, the essential attributes
 of the classes, and second, the basis of dis-
 tinction in each case. It will be noticed that
 the material in the first group of exercises is
 very simple, requiring very little mental effort
 on the part of the pupil. These, however,
 become gradually more difficult until in the last
 groups much more careful examination will be
 necessary.

In all the work of classification and definition
 the pupil is engaged in the actual examination
 of thought. Here begins his first essay in in-
 trospection. He must learn to reproduce in his
 own mental experience the processes
 of which these forms are the expres-
 Grammar, a branch of mental science. sion. If he does not so reproduce
 them, if he fails to make them the
 object of attention, he certainly cannot succeed
 in discovering how they resemble, or how they
 differ from each other. These marks are not
 formal marks which may be discovered upon
 examining words; but marks native to the

mental products themselves; and these must stand out clearly before the mind's eye before they can be examined and compared.

It must be borne in mind, however, that it is a clear, not an adequate knowledge of the judgment that the pupil is expected to acquire at this stage. The teacher must not expect too much. What is wanted is the power to distinguish the judgment from other thought forms. Nor is it to be expected that a high degree of accuracy will at first be attained in the attempt to describe these results. The wise and patient teacher will sympathize with the pupil in his first slow and uncertain attempts in a new field of effort, the examination of his own mental operations.

Few teachers to-day are in any serious danger of committing the mistake of proceeding deliberately to expound the subject to their pupils. But many teachers who would never think of employing the expository method often do, as a matter of fact, contrive to suggest to their pupils the desired forms of expression, at the same time seeming to employ the inductive method. The pupil is skilfully led to the definition which the teacher has in his mind. This

may be merely exposition in disguise, and is one of the most insidious forms of pedagogical error. If after the examination of materials the pupil has not reached what the teacher considers a sufficiently clear idea, the proper procedure is to supply more material and require the pupil to make a further examination.

It is most desirable that the simplest forms of expression should be employed in this subject, such as will to the very least possible extent conflict with those which are used in the higher grammar, and which are entitled to the consideration attaching to prescriptive right. We believe, however, that the terms *notion* and *judgment* should be used from the first.

3. Classification of Sentences.

Having thus gained a clear knowledge of the sentence, he should be in a position to go on to the next step, namely, the classification of sentences. It has already been pointed out that in order to realize the whole meaning of the term "sentence" we must define it, not only by reference to what it implies, but also by refer-

ence to what it denotes. Hence the necessity of an exercise in classification. The pupil goes on to the examination of sentences at large, with the view of discovering some basis of classification. Now, this basis of classification can only

**Thought,
not form
to be
examined.**

be reached as the result of an examination of thought. Forms, of course, must be examined, but always in relation to thought. Sentences may very well be similar in form, and yet different in regard to thought. Different arrangements will, of course, be offered by the pupils. This will be a sign of independent work and effort. For example, pupils, may at first include in one group declaratives and exclamatives. The distinction between these, however, will come later as the result of closer investigation. These different classifications, it will be the duty of the teacher to place before the class for examina-

**Pupils
should criticize faulty
classifications.**

tion and criticism. Next in value to actual work in classifying sentences comes criticism of faulty classification. It is impossible to lay down specific directions regarding the time to be spent on this step or the amount of material required. The teacher, however, can feel quite

sure that there is nothing to be gained by being in a hurry to get on. The wise teacher will make haste slowly. A clear knowledge of these thought forms is essential in order to make progress possible later on.

4. Analysis into Constituent Notions.

When the various kinds of sentences have been defined in this way, the pupil may proceed to the analysis of sentences into their constituent parts. We shall bear in mind that

Analysis of thoughts, not of forms. this work is not a mechanical breaking up into parts of the words composing the sentence. Here the pupil is not dealing with external marks or signs. He is concerned with the sentence as the expression of a judgment, and the task is to show exactly what are the notions which go to make up the judgment. He is to analyze a complex mental product with its elementary parts. It has already been pointed out that the formal judgment is a higher and later mental product than the notion, that the power of the mind to establish and affirm a thought relation between notions depends upon a previous knowledge of these notions. It will be seen, therefore, that

in this separation of the judgment into its constituent elements, the pupil is retracing the steps by which the judgment was reached.

What is
involved in
this
analysis.

To illustrate: the affirmation, "this path is smooth," could only have been made by one having previous knowledge of the two ideas, "path" and "smooth." A complex was presented to his mind. An analysis of this complex enabled him to recognize and affirm a relation between the elements existent therein. What the student of grammar does at this stage is simply to make a more definite analysis of the same complex. The difference between the two operations is not a difference in kind. They differ merely in the fact that the process now explicitly exhibits to the student what must have been implicit before he uttered the judgment. What was implicit in the first judgment was the knowledge of the notions, "path" and "smooth." Without this knowledge the judgment could not have been made. But the mind was not at this time concerned with its own operations, or indeed with anything beyond the affirmation of the complex objective fact, which, in obedience to a law of its nature, of which it was unconscious, it had discovered.

The student of grammar approaches the subject in a totally different attitude, that of **A new mental attitude.** the subjective student, the investigator of his own mental operations and mental products. The mental process itself, as resulting in the discrimination of the two elements, must now become the object of attention. The careful analysis of the materials given in the exercises and such supplementary materials as the teacher will deem necessary, should put the pupil in a position to give fairly good definitions of subject and predicate. These definitions will bear directly upon the judgment; that is to say, he will probably define subject as that notion in the judgment about which something is said, and predicate as that notion in the judgment by which something is said of the subject.

5. Examination of Notions.

The component parts into which the proposition may be separated having thus been distinguished, the pupil will now naturally go on to examine more fully the relation which these parts bear to each other. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of a clear under-

standing of the relation which the predicate bears to the subject. This can only be accomplished by a most patient and careful examination of numerous examples. In order that the pupil may understand the nature of predication and be able to see clearly that judgment is the primary mental act, that what takes the form of a notion is in reality a complex which has been reached as the result of a great number of judgments, he must make a careful examination of notions. This examination will imply the

**The notion
a complex of
possible
predicates.**

breaking up of the seeming notion into the many judgments which originally went to its making. The idea "rose" is not a simple idea, but one compounded of many elements. Each of these elements is a possible predicate. Hence, the true nature of predication cannot be understood by the pupil unless and until he reflects upon this process of establishing or re-establishing the relations involved in this or similar complex notions. What are a few of these elements which may be predicated of the object "rose"? It may be red, large, double, fragrant, wet with dew, growing in the garden. Take the object "horse." Of this we may select for predication any of the

following: Grey, sixteen hands high, strong, swift, handsome, well bred, docile, intelligent, eats hay, belongs to John, worth two hundred dollars, etc. The general idea "gold," stands for a group of ideas, of which we may enumerate, yellow, heavy, hard, precious, found in mines, found in rivers, used as currency, used for ornaments. The teacher must bear in mind,

**The essential
feature of
predication.**

and the pupil must learn, that the essential feature of predication is in the mental act in which each of these elements is seen to form a part of the whole idea for which the word stands. Unless some one of the constituents of a complex idea arises prominently in the mind, and is recognized as such, there is no predication.*

This is a most important step and perhaps calls for further elucidation. What is required in the exercises on page 117 is, that the pupil shall enumerate the constituents which have gone to the making of certain notions, and set forth each in the form of a judgment. Material must be selected with great care. As the pupil is required to recall the various steps by which he

* For a somewhat full discussion of the nature of predication see p. 39.

has reached the notion, it follows that only those notions which are simple in their nature and quite familiar to him are suitable for this exercise. What does the notion "gold" mean to the pupil, and how has he reached that notion? It is a complex of many elements. The number of these elements varies with the adequacy of his notion. At one time in his intellectual career he associated with it the definite colour, yellow. This association was the result of a judgment, whether set forth explicitly at the time or not; and so with all the other qualities which the notion here includes, as malleable, ductile, simple, used as currency, used for ornament, etc. His

**Analysis
should result
in reaffirming
judgments
already made.** analysis of this notion, therefore, should result in the statement of all those judgments which have gone to the making of the notion as it now exists in his mind. This analysis of notions should be a test of the character of his idea of gold, and should tend to make that knowledge clearer. It is a kind of mental exercise, the value of which can scarcely be over-estimated.

6. *Predication—Verbal and Real.*

We may fairly assume that the pupil has a **Predication in general;** general idea of the nature of predication. He has discovered the essential feature in the study of grammatical relation, that is, the principle of modification. He has found this first, in the modifying effect of the predicate upon the subject. He has learned, further, that the same relation of modification which the predicate bears to the subject may also exist in the phrase: that the modifying effect of the word "red" in the phrase "the red rose" is precisely the same as in the proposition "the rose is red." This general study of predication is to be followed by a consideration of the different kinds, verbal and real. This distinction has been fully discussed in the preceding pages, and the exercises provided should require no detailed explanation.

7. *Modifiers.*

He is now in a position to enter upon a more detailed study and classification of modifiers. Obviously, the first distinction to be made is

between the primary modifiers, those which directly affect the principal notions, and which may be called adjectives, and secondary modifiers, those affecting the subject indirectly, that is, through the predicate, called adverbs. Modifiers again may appear in the form of single words, or phrases, or clauses; and the pupil should be led to examine modifiers with this classification in view. His ideas regarding modifiers, will, it is presumed, be fairly clear by the time he has further examined sentences, exhibiting variety of structure, and has reached a classification upon that basis.

8. *Connectives.*

The work done up to this point, if it has been the pupil's own work, has been of such a nature as to show with perfect clearness the nature of the proposition as a whole, the constituent parts of the proposition, and their relation to each other. The various relations in which propositions and the parts thereof stand to each other should now be the object of a more detailed study, and this study is best furthered by a careful classification of the connectives employed in linking them together. The pupil cannot classify

connectives unless he succeeds in making clear to himself the exact nature of the connected parts.

**Used to
express
relations.**

They are employed to indicate relations between different thoughts and thought elements, that is to say, between two judgments, or between a judgment and a notion, or between two notions.

The pupil, after considerable exercise in comparing different connectives, will probably distinguish between the conjunction and the preposition on this basis. That is to say, the conjunction in all cases joins a judgment to some other judgment, or notion ; whereas the preposition joins notions only. Later on, as his knowledge of the subject increases, he will discover that this distinction is really one between the

**The
subjective
and the
objective.**

subjective and the objective, that a relation involving a judgment is one which exists purely in the mind, whereas the judgment itself is an organic whole, whose parts are to be regarded as related to each other, independent of the mind.

9. Inflection.

This outline of the order of topics to be pursued in the study of the grammar of the judgment as distinct from the grammar of the notion,

is completed by an examination of examples of differences in sentence function as indicated by changes in form. Inflection is to receive attention only in so far as changes in the form of words indicate different qualities of the judgment, or different sentence function. A detailed study of this department belongs properly to the grammar of the notion, where it merges into the later branch of the subject, known as historical grammar, a branch for which the student should now be fully prepared.

SECTION III.
EXERCISES.

EXERCISES.

I.—EXERCISES LEADING TO A CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF THE JUDGMENT.

The pupil will examine, compare and classify these thought forms. The classes are to be clearly distinguished and defined.

I.

1. A tree. 2. A rose. 3. The house is white.
4. The dog. 5. John is tired. 6. The bottle is empty. 7. An ink-bottle. 8. The sky. 9. This tree is tall. 10. The cows are thirsty.

II.

1. The deep blue sea. 2. The rose is red.
3. Cows give milk. 4. The street. 5. The prairie. 6. Early in the morning. 7. The horses are ploughing. 8. The old homestead. 9. The Queen loves her people. 10. The days are stormy.

III.

1. An old drinking cup. 2. The house on the corner. 3. The seashore. 4. The mill on the river. 5. Trees are bare in winter. 6. Their lives are happy. 7. A primrose by a river's brim. 8. A lad of about sixteen. 9. Half a hundred bridges. 10. The sweet forget-me-nots.

IV.

1. The captain of the gate. 2. A little sleep.
3. A little folding of the hands. 4. Now the day
is over. 5. The tender mercies of the wicked.
6. The old house was pulled down. 7. He was
a man to all the country dear. 8. The train
was late. 9. The house stands on the corner.
10. Many a silvery water break above the
golden gravel.

V.

1. Standing by a purpose true. 2. A very
present help in trouble. 3. The old mill stood
by the river. 4. Roses are red. 5. All the
children in the house. 6. Walking by the sea-
shore. 7. He walked in silence along the shore.
8. The dog barks. 9. The barking dog. 10. Cold
blows the north wind.

VI.

1. Wasting his time on trifles. 2. He stands
by his friends. 3. The tender mercies of the
wicked are cruel. 4. A man to be proud of.
5. Ready to find fault and hard to please.
6. Giving one's money away liberally. 7. Caesar
crossed the Rubicon. 8. A desire to become the
owner of the property. 9. He wastes his time
on trifles. 10. There fell a blighting frost.

VII.

1. In spite of everything and everybody.
 2. Fair as the earliest beam of eastern light.
 3. To die—to sleep—perchance to dream. 4. The
 sun sank slowly to rest. 5. The horses gallop
 merrily along. 6. They prance about. 7. Through
 mud and rain. 8. Apart from his own wishes in
 the matter. 9. The old house looks gay. 10. The
 moon sails serenely through the sky.

VIII.

1. Down the chimney St. Nicholas came with
 a bound. 2. A bundle of toys he had flung on
 his back. 3. He, like a pedlar just opening
 his pack. 4. Now the consul's brow was sad.
 5. Darkly looked he at the wall. 6. Forth
 with a cry sprang Titus. 7. The keen demands
 of appetite. 8. Stooping down from hawthorn
 top. 9. He found his supper somewhere else.
 10. Blessed are the meek.

IX.

1. There came a voice from Heaven. 2. Clouds
 spread over the sky. 3. Across the sea they
 speed. 4. Full many a gem of purest ray serene.
 5. A thousand knights are pressing close behind
 the snow-white crest. 6. I can see the house in

the distance. 7. Slow dropping veils of thinnest lawn. 8. A glimmering light in the east. 9. The ravelled sleeve of care. 10. Just enough religion to make us hate one another.

X.

1. A certain spider swollen up to the first magnitude by the destruction of an infinite number of flies. 2. Thrice he endeavoured to force his passage. 3. Urging his own reasons without the least regard to the answers and objections of his opposite. 4. The spider began his argument in the true spirit of controversy. 5. Peg lodged in a garret exposed to the north wind. 6. John Bull was an honest, plain-dealing fellow—choleric, bold, and of a very inconstant temper. 7. In times of doubt and danger to his person and family. 8. Every age has its own manners. 9. The power of the Crown has grown up anew. 10. Not inclined to pay the King any great compliment.

II.—CLASSIFICATION OF SENTENCES.

The pupil will examine, compare and classify the thought forms. The classes are to be clearly distinguished and defined.

I.

1. The bird sings. 2. How sweetly the bird sings. 3. Run home quickly. 4. Flowers bloom.

5. What a bright day we had. 6. Is the bird singing? 7. Cows are useful. 8. Was John at church this morning? 9. Sing more softly. 10. Did you run all the way home?

II.

1. How the wind blows. 2. Tell me the truth. 3. Read me a story. 4. What a lovely colour the clouds have. 5. The cars run very swiftly. 6. Can I trust you with this vase? 7. The buildings are high. 8. Do you ever see him? 9. The church bell is ringing. 10. Walk softly upstairs.

III.

1. Will you assist me? 2. Clouds sail slowly across the sky. 3. Where is his coat? 4. How cool it is in this shady spot. 5. The dog knows his master. 6. When do you think of going? 7. Drink your tea. 8. Do you take tea? 9. What cold weather we had last winter. 10. The people are walking to church.

IV.

1. Drive more slowly across the bridge. 2. How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank. 3. Face the wall. 4. He knows his lesson. 5. Are blackbirds useful? 6. Won't Henry sing

for us? 7. Do sing, Henry. 8. Such happy days they were. 9. What a noble man he was. 10. Their swords are rust.

V.

1. Speak gently. 2. How dull it would be to live there. 3. The fire burned brightly. 4. Were the boys well? 5. Write a letter to your aunt. 6. How softly she sleeps. 7. Hold up your head. 8. They sang of home. 9. Brightly gleams our banner. 10. How many happy years have fled. 11. The earth is full of anger.

VI.

1. Have you been successful in your researches? 2. Wellington betray his country—the idea! 3. Go to the ant, thou sluggard. 4. What a fall was there, my countrymen. 5. Whence is that knocking? 6. Let the earth hide thee. 7. I have done the State some service. 8. Who put my man in the stocks? 9. Bid her devise some means to come. 10. He hath borne me on his back a thousand times.

VII.

1. How like a fawning publican he looks. 2. Where be your gibes now? 3. I give thee sixpence—I'll see thee hanged first! 4. I will a

round, unvarnished tale deliver. 5. Who are these coming to the sacrifice? 6. Who will stand on either hand and keep the bridge with me? 7. The good sword of Aulus was lifted up to slay. 8. Do right between us twain. 9. How she danced with pleasure to see my civic crown. 10. Mark my tale with care.

VIII.

1. To what green altar, O mysterious priest, lead'st thou that heifer lowing at the skies? 2. A thing of beauty is a joy forever. 3. Upon the sodden ground his old right hand lay nerveless, listless, dead, unsceptred. 4. Our good father Tiber bare bravely up his chin. 5. The good wife's shuttle merrily goes flashing through the loom. 6. Hew down the bridge, Sir Consul. 7. What a rapturous cry from all the city's thousand spires arose. 8. What eye of living thing may brook on his blazing brow to look. 9. Let each aim to deliver his countryman from distress. 10. What shadows we are, and what shadows we pursue.

IX.

1. Thou art the voice to kingly boys to lift them through the fight. 2. With what a look

the hollow eye of the lean watchman glared upon the foes. 3. What is left of all this glorious world. 4. Now the ugly bullets come pecking through the dust. 5. The captains and the kings depart. 6. Let God be judge between you and me. 7. How dull it is to pause, to make an end, to rust unburnished. 8. Ho! gunners, fire a loud salute. 9. When shall we three meet again? 10. Go forth and meet the shadowy future without fear and with a manly heart.

X.

1. Let these sentiments be engraved on your memory. 2. Rouse not a peace-loving, but a resolute people. 3. How often have I played under these trees when a boy. 4. Do you think I have nothing to do but to mend and repair after you? 5. It is a miserable thing to live in suspense—the life of a spider. 6. How inconsistent is man with himself. 7. The deep moans round with many voices. 8. My mind to me a kingdom is. 9. How charming is divine philosophy. 10. See the heavy clouds low falling, and bright Hesperus down calling the dead night from under ground.

XI.

Classify the judgments in the following :

"My dear sir," said Scrooge, quickening his pace, and taking the old gentleman by both his hands. "How do you do? I hope you succeeded yesterday. It was very kind of you. A merry Christmas to you, sir!"

"Mr. Scrooge?"

"Yes," said Scrooge. "That is my name, and I fear it may not be pleasant to you. Allow me to ask your pardon. And will you have the goodness"—here Scrooge whispered in his ear.

"Lord bless me!" cried the gentleman, as if his breath were taken away. "My dear Mr. Scrooge, are you serious?"

"If you please," said Scrooge. "Not a farthing less. A great many back-payments are included in it, I assure you. Will you do me that favour?"

"My dear sir," said the other, shaking hands with him. "I don't know what to say to such munifi——"

"Don't say anything, please," retorted Scrooge. "Come and see me. Will you come and see me?"

"I will!" cried the old gentleman; and it was clear he meant to do it.

"Thank'ee," said Scrooge. "I am much obliged to you. I thank you fifty times. Bless you!"

In the afternoon he turned his steps towards his nephew's house. He passed the door a dozen times, before he had the courage to go up and knock. But he made a dash, and did it.

"Is your master at home, my dear?" said Scrooge to the girl. Nice girl! Very.

"Yes, sir."

"Where is he, my love?" said Scrooge.

"He's in the dining-room, sir, along with mistress. I'll show you upstairs, if you please."

"Thank'ee. He knows me," said Scrooge, with his hand already on the dining-room lock. "I'll go in here, my dear."

He turned it gently, and sidled his face in, round the door. They were looking at the table (which was spread out in great array); for these young housekeepers are always nervous on such points, and like to see that everything is right.

"Fred!" said Scrooge.

Dear heart alive, how his niece by marriage started! Scrooge had forgotten, for the moment,

about her sitting in the corner with the footstool, or he wouldn't have done it, on any account.

"Why, bless my soul!" cried Fred, "who's that?"

"It's I. Your uncle Scrooge. I have come to dinner. Will you let me in, Fred?"

Let him in! It is a mercy he didn't shake his arm off. He was at home in five minutes. Nothing could be heartier. His niece looked just the same. So did Topper when *he* came. So did the plump sister, when *she* came. So did every one when *they* came. Wonderful party, wonderful games, wonderful unanimity, wonderful happiness!

III.—ANALYSIS INTO CONSTITUENT NOTIONS.

The pupil will separate each thought form into its constituent notions.

I.

1. The river is swift. 2. The dog is a faithful animal. 3. The dog is a quadruped. 4. Nights are cool. 5. The furrows are straight. 6. The tax-payers are voters. 7. The boys were swift skaters. 8. Horses are useful. 9. Gold is yellow. 10. The bridge is unsafe.

II.

1. Merchants are tax-payers. 2. The farmer is the happy man. 3. The churches are beautiful. 4. Sleep is refreshing. 5. Soldiers are our protectors. 6. Wellington was an Irishman. 7. Man is mortal. 8. The tree is straight. 9. Paper is white. 10. Ploughing is a pleasant task.

III.

1. The morning was fine. 2. The rebels were a small force. 3. The roads are muddy. 4. The house is warm. 5. The dog is hairy. 6. The bottle is empty. 7. Books are cheap. 8. The cover is blue. 9. The cover is torn.

IV.

1. The dog was a Newfoundland. 2. Carlo is black. 3. The dog was stolen. 4. Carlo was a bad dog. 5. Carlo was whipped. 6. The tobacco is mild. 7. This tobacco is the imported article. 8. This tobacco is home-grown. 9. These blankets were imported. 10. These blankets were manufactured in Canada.

V.

1. The lady is a great singer. 2. Policemen are careful. 3. The lady sings beautifully.

4. Policemen guard our houses. 5. The dog barks. 6. The bell is loud. 7. The bell is ringing. 8. The bell rings. 9. The steamboat is swift. 10. The boats move along.

VI.

1. The horses are tired. 2. I am tired. 3. The wind is high. 4. The wind blows. 5. The mountain is a mile high. 6. The mountain is covered with snow. 7. The plains are rolling. 8. The fields are ripe. 9. The farm yields wheat. 10. Farmers prosper in Manitoba.

VII.

1. The Queen is gracious to her subjects. 2. The sovereign loves her people. 3. Wolves howl at night. 4. The cows are in the corn. 5. Cows give milk. 6. The cows are coming home. 7. The cows walk slowly home. 8. The bell tinkles. 9. The clouds are black. 10. The clouds move rapidly.

VIII.

1. The snow melts rapidly. 2. The ice is covered with water. 3. In the morning the sky is cloudy. 4. Down from the mountain top the eagle was sailing. 5. Again the shout was heard. 6. James is the tallest boy in the room. 7. Mary

is taller than Tom. 8. This pole is the strongest.
9. This pole is stronger than that. 10. Toronto
is a large city.

IX.

1. Slowly the hour hand of the clock moves
round. 2. The hour hand seems motionless.
3. Great is Diana of the Ephesians. 4. Nearer
and nearer they came. 5. No man is able
to tell. 6. No man knows the spot. 7. The
king is come to marshal us. 8. He hath bound
a snow-white plume upon his gallant crest.
9. Its value is greater than rubies. 10. To err
is human.

X.

1. The nightingale cheered the village with
his song. 2. He began to feel the keen demands
of appetite. 3. The worm addressed him thus
right eloquent. 4. Loud sang the souls of the
jolly, jolly mariners. 5. At an early hour the
general ordered his troops to advance. 6. Then
like a crag down Apennine rushed Auster to the
fray. 7. How beautiful is night. 8. Sad is the
lot of the motherless bairn. 9. He was not able
to render any assistance. 10. The King and his
army were there.

XI.

The forebodings of the Baron proved true. In the afternoon the weather changed. The western wind began to blow, and drew a cloud-veil over the face of heaven. Soon the snow began to fall. Athwart the distant landscape it swept like a white mist. The storm wind came from the Alsatian hills, and struck the dense clouds aslant through the air. And ever faster fell the snow. The setting sun glared wildly from the summit of the hills. It sank like a burning ship at sea wrecked in the tempest. Thus the evening set in. Winter stood at the gate wagging his white and shaggy beard, like an old harper chanting an old rhyme.

XII.

Down the chimney St. Nicholas came with a bound.

He was dress'd all in fur from his head to his foot,
And his clothes were all tarnish'd with ashes and soot ;

A bundle of toys he had flung on his back,
And he looked like a pedlar just opening his pack.
His eyes—how they twinkled ! his dimples—
how merry !

His cheeks were like roses, his nose like a cherry !

His droll little mouth was drawn up like a bow,
 And the beard of his chin was as white as the
 snow ;

The stump of his pipe he held tight in his teeth !
 And the smoke it encircled his head like a wreath.

XIII.

Yell'd on the view the opening pack ;
 Rock, glen, and cavern, paid them back ;
 To many a mingled sound at once
 The awaken'd mountain gave response.
 A hundred dogs bay'd deep and strong,
 Clatter'd a hundred steeds along,
 Their peal the merry horns rung out,
 A hundred voices join'd the shout ;
 With hark and whoop and wild halloo,
 No rest Benvoirlich's echoes knew.
 Far from the tumult fled the roe,
 Close in her covert cower'd the doe,
 The falcon, from her cairn on high,
 Cast on the rout a wondering eye,
 Till far beyond her piercing ken
 The hurricane had swept the glen.
 Faint, and more faint, its failing din
 Return'd from cavern, cliff, and linn,
 And silence settled, wide and still,
 On the lone wood and mighty hill.

XIV.

Hot was the battle, and bloody the fight,
Cool was the evening and peaceful the night.
From the camp in the wood where the valley
 lies lone,
Three times the signalling trumpet has blown.
Loud and ringing its clear notes fall,
Over wood and field they hear the "Recall."
In troops and by knots, by three and by two,
Back they straggle, the valiant few.
Ah ! not all are returning back ;
Full many a man doth the regiment lack.
They were there in their places at reveillé,
At night they lie cold, and pallid to see.
And horses whose saddles are empty to-night
Are galloping wildly to left and to right.
But the bray of the trumpet that sounds the
 recall,
For the third time summoneth one and all.

XV.

Champlain was an explorer. He dearly loved
to wander over all parts of the country. He
was a brave soldier and very fond of adventures.
He wanted to travel all over the great lakes and

rivers, and teach the Indians. Work among the Indians was very hard. To begin with, all the red men living in wigwams were not good friends. The different tribes were always fighting with each other. The strongest of these tribes were the Iroquois. They were very brave, fierce Indians, and they were always ready for war. The other tribes of Indians were in great fear of the savage Iroquois. These were the Hurons and Algonquins.

The Hurons and Algonquins came to trust Champlain fully. A treaty was made, and Champlain promised to help them to fight the Iroquois. On one of his journeys he first came upon the beautiful stretch of water, Lake Champlain. Not far from it lay the bark wigwam villages of the Iroquois. And here Champlain helped his Indian friends to fight the Iroquois. But how he hated to see them torture the prisoners taken in the battle.

XVI.

At Rouen I was struck by the union of venerable antiquity with extreme liveliness and gayety. We have nothing of this sort in England. Till the time of James the First our houses are almost all of wood, and have in con-

sequence disappeared. In York there are some very old streets, but they are abandoned to the lowest people, and the gay shops are in the newly-built quarter of the town. In Rouen you have street after street of lofty stern looking masses of stone with gothic carvings. The buildings are so high, and the ways are so narrow, that the sun can scarcely reach the pavements. Yet in these streets you have all the glitter of Regent street.

IV.—EXAMINATION OF NOTIONS.

Enumerate the constituents which have gone to the making of the following notions, setting forth each in the form of a judgment.

I.

1. The rose. 2. The moon. 3. The cup. 4. A cat. 5. A knife. 6. Snow. 7. A stone. 8. A brick. 9. Grass. 10. Water.

II.

1. Mountain. 2. River. 3. A cloud. 4. A tree. 5. A bird. 6. A house. 7. A horse. 8. A soldier. 9. A fish. 10. A flower.

III.

1. Glass. 2. Wood. 3. Plant. 4. Marble. 5. Brook. 6. Canadian. 7. Book. 8. Fire. 9. Queen. 10. Subject.

IV.

1. Bread. 2. Food. 3. Carriage. 4. Leaf.
5. Fruit. 6. Iron. 7. Star. 8. Merchant.
9. Farmer. 10. Artist.

V.

1. Bank manager. 2. A red rose. 3. The full moon. 4. A large leafy tree. 5. An interesting story book. 6. The Premier of Canada. 7. Historical painting. 8. Narrow gauge railway. 9. Mountain covered with snow. 10. Agricultural implement. 11. Wild grey goose.

V.—PREDICATION.

The pupil will compare the sentences with regard to the effect of the various predicates upon the subject.

I.

1. This house is large. 2. This house is large and red. 3. This house is large and red and old. 4. This house is large and red and old and roofed with tin. 5. This large, red, old tin roofed house stands on the corner. 6. This large, red, old, tin roofed house on the corner belongs to Mr. Jones. 7. This large, red, old, tin-roofed house on the corner, belonging to Mr. Jones, was built in 1876. 8. This large, red, old, tin-roofed house

on the corner, belonging to Mr. Jones, and built in 1876, was offered for sale. 9. This large, red, old tin-roofed house on the corner, belonging to Mr. Jones, built in 1876 and offered for sale was bought for \$1,000. 10. This large, red, old, tin-roofed house on the corner, belonging to Mr. Jones, built in 1876, offered for sale, and bought for \$1000, is used as a workshop.

II.

1. The prairie is rolling. 2. The rolling prairie is watered by occasional small streams. 3. The rolling prairie, watered by occasional small streams is dotted with farm houses. 4. The rolling prairie, watered by occasional small streams and dotted with farm houses, is covered with flowers in spring. 5. The rolling prairie, watered by occasional small streams, dotted with farm houses, and covered with flowers in spring, is beautiful to look upon.

III.

1. The bird in the tree sings sweetly. 2. The bird in the tree sings a sweet song. 3. The cloud sails swiftly along the sky. 4. The knife blade is covered with rust. 5. Soft winds blow gently from the south. 6. Horses toil willingly

for man. 7. Music hath charms to soothe the savage breast. 8. The quality of mercy is not strained. 9. Men may rise on stepping stones of their dead selves to higher things. 10. An honest man is the noblest work of God.

IV.

1. The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. 2. The lowing herd winds slowly o'er the lea. 3. The ploughman homeward plods his weary way. 4. 'Tis sweet to hear the watch dog's honest bark. 5. The short streets were choked up with a dingy mist half thawed half frozen. 6. The ghost stopped for a moment at a certain warehouse door. 7. A solitary child neglected by his friends is left there still. 8. I see the lords of human kind pass by. 9. To be hungry is a sufficient excuse for most men. 10. To command success is not in mortals.

V.

1. St. Swithin is said to have wrought many miracles. 2. Sir Wilfrid Laurier is Premier of Canada. 3. Plato was a great philosopher. 4. Homer was the author of the Iliad. 5. Metals conduct heat and electricity. 6. Snow is cold and white. 7. St. Paul's is a great national

cathedral. 8. The government looks after the property and lives of the citizens. 9. Pain is unpleasant. 10. The sun gives light and heat.

VI.—PREDICATION.

The pupil will examine, compare and classify these judgments on the ground of difference in predication, real and verbal.

I.

1. The ball is round. 2. The ball is blue.
3. Fire burns. 4. The fire was put on at six
5. Water quenches thirst. 6. The water is hard.
7. Sugar is sweet. 8. Sugar is manufactured
in Montreal. 9. Houses are made to dwell in.
10. These houses are built of stone.

II.

1. Snow is cold. 2. Plants grow. 3. Quad-
rupeds have four feet. 4. Mountains are high.
5. Snow fell yesterday. 6. The plants are four
feet high. 7. The mountain is wooded. 8. The
mountain is covered with snow. 9. Pain is
unpleasant. 10. The pain was most severe in
the evening.

III.

1. Boats are made to move on the water.
2. This boat was the fastest on the river.

3. Blood is red. 4. Blood covered his hands. 5. The wheel is round. 6. The wheel has a pneumatic tire. 7. The boat drifted out of its course. 8. The wheel ran over his leg. 9. Snow is white. 10. Gold is legal tender.

IV.

1. Carnivora eat flesh. 2. Gold is yellow. 3. The horse is a quadruped. 4. Gold is used for ornaments. 5. The horse can travel over ten miles an hour. 6. The water came into the boat. 7. Sea water is salt. 8. Lead is used for bullets. 9. Lead is heavy. 10. Rain comes from the clouds.

V.

1. Waggon's are sometimes used in that country. 2. Fish abound in this lake. 3. Shoes are imported in large quantities. 4. The pen is of steel. 5. Birds have feathers. 6. Sailors travel in ships. 7. The windows look to the south. 8. Waggon's have wheels. 9. Fish can swim in water. 10. The birds have yellow feathers.

VI.

1. Elastic stretches. 2. Horses are quadrupeds. 3. The waggon's have wide tires. 4. Circles are round. 5. Merchants buy and sell

goods. 6. The birds are silent in their nests. 7. The merchants are prosperous. 8. Pens are used for writing. 9. The sailors sing merrily at their work. 10. Shoes are for the feet.

VII.

1. A square has four sides. 2. Shoemakers make shoes. 3. The ball will roll. 4. Hay is cured grass. 5. Hay is twenty dollars a ton. 6. The ball was thrown over the fence. 7. The shoemaker was a tall man. 8. Ink is used for writing. 9. The shoemaker lived on the corner of the street. 10. The ink was frozen.

VIII.

1. Farmers are waiting anxiously for rain. 2. Trees grow in the ground. 3. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points. 4. The chimney is twenty feet high. 5. The chimney is to carry off smoke. 6. Islands are surrounded by water. 7. Farmers raise crops. 8. Trees cover most of the mountain. 9. A straight line from here to the tree would be ten feet. 10. The islands look beautiful in summer.

IX.

1. The church steeple points to the sky. 2. Triangles have three sides. 3. The steeple

is covered with tin. 4. Stones sink in water. 5. Rainbows curve along the sky. 6. This triangle is larger than that. 7. Glass is brittle. 8. The monarch was beloved by his people. 9. Glass is made in Germany. 10. There are sixty seconds in a minute.

X.

1. Monarchs have subjects. 2. Justice is giving to all their due. 3. The minister preached a long sermon. 4. Money is used in trading. 5. Copper is used for money. 6. Windows admit light. 7. Sovereignty is the authority of one or more men over others. 8. Six is three times two. 9. Bodies occupy space. 10. Copper is found in Canada.

VII.—MODIFIERS.

The pupil will examine, compare and classify the modifiers on the basis of sentence function.

I.

1. This rose is red. 2. A tall lady entered. 3. She sang sweetly. 4. My dog barked fiercely. 5. The wedding guest stood still. 6. They retired slowly. 7. A tall lad walked by. 8. His notable little wife bustled about. 9. A few amber clouds floated along. 10. His hospitable attentions were brief.

II.

1. Bright flowers bloom in spring. 2. Birds of a feather flock together. 3. Love rules the camp, the court, the grove. 4. Spare diet cures many ills. 5. Large birds fly swiftly. 6. Seven other kine came up after them. 7. The weary Trojans ply their shattered oars. 8. Down sinks the ship within the abyss below. 9. At this moment the ship went down. 10. The grim taciturn bear climbs down the dark ravine.

III.

1. Many dismal tales were told. 2. This horrible tale was told slowly, distinctly, impressively. 3. Rip's sole domestic adherent was Wolf. 4. He looked anxiously around. 5. The stout old gentleman wore a laced doublet. 6. His companion now emptied the keg. 7. Cowards die many times before their death. 8. The lowing herd winds slowly o'er the lea. 9. The ploughman homeward plods his weary way. 10. The darkness falls from the wings of night.

IV.

1. To every man upon this earth death comes soon or late. 2. John Bull's domestic establishment is enormously expensive. 3. Here poor

Rip seated himself. 4. He saw the lordly Hudson far far below. 4. His head gradually declined. 6. There shallow drafts intoxicate the brain. 7. Faint heart never won fair lady. 8. He bears his blushing honours thick upon him. 9. Small cheer and great welcome make a merry feast. 10. The cellar door flew open with a booming sound.

V.

1. The small birds were taking their farewell banquets. 2. Drinking largely sobers us again. 3. The dew on his thin robe was heavy and chill. 4. Full many a flower is born to blush unseen. 5. Thus he bore without abuse the grand old name of gentleman. 6. Thus secured against surprise he took off his cravat. 7. In came a fiddler with a music book. 8. At last the dinner was all done. 9. With a shilling message or small parcel in his hand his courage, always high, rose higher. 10. The wintry sun too powerless for warmth looked down upon the ice.

VI.

1. Then up rose Mrs. Cratchit dressed out but poorly in a twice turned gown, but brave in ribbons. 2. Still the red-faced gentlemen ex-

tolled the good old times. 3. At length the dull and stifling atmosphere began to freshen. 4. In the afternoon he slowly walked towards the river. 5. A herd of boys with clamour bowled and stumped the wicket. 6. All the rosy heights came out above the lawns. 7. Out I sprang from glow to gloom. 8. Here above the garden's glowing blossom-belts a columned entry shone. 9. This lovely yew-tree stands far from all human dwelling. 10. In that deep valley, Michael had designed to build a sheepfold.

VII.

1. A good report did from their kinsman come of Luke and his well-doing. 2. Vital feelings of delight shall rear her form to stately height. 3. There came a youth from Georgia's shore. 4. A military casque he wove with splendid feathers drest. 5. The wakeful Ruth at midnight shed a solitary tear. 6. For thee a funeral bell shall ring. 7. Almost primeval simplicity reigns over the northern land. 8. Loose over her shoulders falls her flaxen hair. 9. Near the churchyard gate stands a poor-box, fastened to a post by iron bands. 10. The women carry psalm books in their hands wrapped in silk handkerchiefs.

VIII.

1. I left our cottage threshold sallying forth with a huge wallet o'er my shoulders slung. 2. Before me shone a glorious world fresh as a banner bright. 3. With these words Socrates raised the cup to his lips, and drank very calmly and cheerfully. 4. Overhead hang the fanlike branches trailing with moss. 5. The bright sun now past his middle course shoots down his fiercest beams. 6. From scenes like these old Scotia's grandeur springs. 7. A single person working entirely by himself will not be able to obtain more than sufficient food for his own subsistence. 8. The blood and spirits of Le Fevre waxing cold and slow within him and retreating to their last citadel, the heart, rallied back. 9. The gentle lark, weary of rest, from his moist cabinet mounts up on high. 10. At the beginning of his majesty's reign Lord Talbot came to the administration of a great department in the household.

IX.

1. All the wheels of government at home and abroad were stopped. 2. The sloth in its wild state spends its whole life in trees. 3. Some

five or six months before his death he began to grow jealous of everybody. 4. When a Fellow of Eton College he addressed a series of discourses to the scholars. 5. Elevated high above his vassals came the Inca, borne on a sedan or open-litter. 6. Now my soul unused to stretch her powers in flight so daring drops her weary wing. 7. The cottager's wife will ask him to sit down, in hearty Devonshire phrase. 8. The first years of a young barrister are spent in anxious leisure. 9. The next morning I got up early to look at the newspapers. 10. A branch of thorns with berries on it, and recently separated from the tree, floated by them.

X.

1. Sir Walter, restless as the veering wind, calls to the tired dogs. 2. To make thy praises known another monument shall here be raised. 3. This beast not unobserved by Nature fell. 4. Forth sprang the impassioned queen her lord to clasp. 5. Repeating one's statements does not prove them true. 6. By an exclusive attention to one class of phenomena the human intellect was stunted. 7. The queen who could not hide her anxiety hoped that he would return. 8. To

build a bridge at that point on the river was pronounced impossible. 9. From peak to peak the rattling crags among leaps the live thunder. 10. The poor beetle that we tread upon finds a pang as great as when a giant dies.

XI.

So Hector ran through the city to the Scæan gates, and there Andromache spied him, and hasted to meet him. And with her was the nurse, bearing the young child on her bosom—Hector's only child, beautiful, headed as a star. Silently he smiled when he saw the child, but Andromache clasped his hand and wept, and said:

“O Hector, thy courage will bring thee to death. Thou hast no pity on thy wife and child, but sparest not thyself, and all the Greeks will rush on thee and slay thee. It were better for me, losing thee, to die; for I have no comfort but thee. My father is dead, for Achilles slew him but spoiled him not, so much he revered him. With his arms he burnt him, and the mountain-nymphs planted poplars about his grave. Seven brethren I had, and lo! they all fell in one day by the hand of the great Achilles.

And my mother, she is dead, for when she had been ransomed, Artemis smote her with an arrow in her father's house. But thou art father to me, and mother and brother and husband also. Have pity, then, and stay here upon the wall, lest thou leave me a widow and thy child an orphan."

But Hector said: "I would not that any son or daughter of Troy should see me skulking from the war. And my own heart loathes the thought, and bids me fight in the front. Well I know, indeed, that Priam, and the people of Priam, and holy Troy, will perish. Yet it is not for Troy, or for the people, or even for my father or my mother, that I care so much, as for thee in the day when some Greek shall carry thee away captive, and thou shalt ply the loom or carry the pitcher in the land of Greece. And some one shall say when he sees thee, 'This was Hector's wife, who was the bravest of the sons of Troy.' May the earth cover me before that day!"

Then Hector stretched out his arms to his child. But the child drew back into the bosom of his nurse with a loud cry, fearing the shining bronze and the horse-hair plume which nodded awfully from his helmet-top. Then father and

mother laughed aloud. And Hector took the helmet from his head and laid it on the ground, and caught his child in his hands, and kissed him and dandled him, praying aloud to Father Zeus and all the gods.

“Grant, Father Zeus and all ye gods, that this child may be great among the sons of Troy; and may they say some day, when they see him carrying home the bloody spoils from the war, ‘A better man than his father this,’ and his mother shall be glad at heart.”

Then he gave the child to his mother, and she clasped him to her breast and smiled a tearful smile. And her husband had pity on her, and stroked her with his hand, and spake :

“Be not troubled overmuch. No man shall slay me against the ordering of fate; but as for fate, that, I trow, no man may escape, be he coward or brave. But go, ply thy tasks, the shuttle and the loom, and give their tasks to thy maidens, and let men take thought for the battle.”

Then Hector took up his helmet from the ground, and Andromache went her way to her home, oft turning back her eyes. And when she was come, she and all her maidens wailed for

the living Hector as though he were dead, for she thought that she would never see him any more returning safe from the battle.

And as Hector went his way, Paris came running, clad in shining arms, like to some proud steed which has been fed high in his stall, and now scours the plain with head aloft and mane streaming over his shoulders. And he spake to Hector :

“I have kept thee, I fear, when thou wast in haste, nor came at thy bidding.”

But Hector answered, “No man can blame thy courage, only thou willfully heldest back from the battle. Therefore do the sons of Troy speak shame of thee. But now let us go to the war.”

So they went together out of the gates, and fell upon the hosts of the Greeks and slew many chiefs of fame.

XII.

Old Baltus Van Tassel was a perfect picture of a thriving, contented, liberal hearted farmer. He seldom sent either his eyes or his thoughts beyond the boundaries of his own farm ; but within these, everything was snug, happy, and well-conditioned. He was satisfied with his

wealth, but not proud of it. His stronghold was situated on the banks of the Hudson, in a green sheltered fertile nook. A great elm tree spread its branches over it. At the foot of the tree bubbled up a spring of the softest and sweetest water, in a little well, formed of a barrel; and then stole sparkling away through the grass to a neighbouring brook, that babbled along among alders and dwarf-willows. Hard by the farm house was a vast barn, that might have served for a church. Every window and crevice seemed bursting forth with the treasures of the farm. The flail was busy resounding within it from morning to night. Swallows and martins skimmed twittering about the eaves. Rows of pigeons were enjoying the sunshine on the roof. Sleek unwieldy porkers were grunting in the repose and abundance of their pens. A stately squadron of snowy geese were riding in an adjoining pond convoying whole fleets of ducks. Regiments of turkeys were gobbling through the farm-yard; and guinea-fowls fretting about it like ill-tempered housewives, with their peevish discontented cry. Before the barn door strutted the gallant cock that pattern of a husband, a warrior, and a fine gentleman; clapping his

burnished wings and crowing in the pride and gladness of his heart—sometimes tearing up the earth with his feet, and then generously calling his ever-hungry family of wives and children to enjoy the rich morsel which he had discovered.

XIII.

To do the duties of the chapel, he maintains, at a large expense, a pious and portly family chaplain. He is a most learned and decorous personage, and a truly well-bred Christian. He always backs the old gentleman in his opinions, winks discreetly at his little peccadilloes, rebukes the children when refractory, and is of great use in exhorting the tenants to read their Bibles, say their prayers, and above all, to pay their rents punctually and without grumbling.

The family apartments are in a very antiquated taste, somewhat heavy, and often inconvenient, but full of the solemn magnificence of former times; fitted up with rich, though faded tapestry, unwieldy furniture, and loads of massy, gorgeous old plate. There are complete suites of rooms, apparently deserted and time worn; and towers and turrets tottering to decay; so that in high winds there is danger of their tumbling about the ears of the household.

He has frequently been advised to have the old edifice thoroughly overhauled, but the old gentleman always grows testy on this subject. He swears the house is an excellent house, that it is tight and weather-proof, and not to be shaken by tempests. It has stood for several hundred years, and therefore is not likely to tumble down now. His family is accustomed to the inconveniences, and would not be comforted without them.

VIII.—MODIFIERS.

(a) *The pupil will examine, compare and classify the modifiers on the basis of structure.*

(b) *The pupil will examine, compare and classify the judgments on the basis of structure.*

I.

1. The clouds around the setting sun assumed a new appearance. 2. The air was more mild and warm. 3. About two hours before midnight, Columbus, standing on the fore-castle, observed a light at a distance. 4. The men who were in ambush near the gate ran to assist their friends. 5. At this critical moment a fresh comely woman passed through the throng. 6. The long, wide avenue of tiny shops stretched out behind the storm. 7. As we rode over the

moat, the flakes began to fall more thickly. 8. This is the house that Jack built. 9. The massive structures of antiquity that are everywhere to be met with in Europe exhibit the remains of great strength. 10. An harbour, which had been constructed of lattice work was covered with vegetation.

II.

1. One trooper cried out vehemently that the enemy was at hand. 2. The veins of copper which lie in the same region were altogether neglected. 3. The Irish were the only people in Northern Europe who had remained true to the old religion. 4. Of late years he had resided almost entirely with the squire, to whom he had become a factotum. 5. Over the heavy projecting fireplace was suspended a picture of a warrior. 6. The animal he bestrode was a broken-down plough-horse that had outlived almost everything but his viciousness. 7. After his return he went to Bath to recruit his health. 8. In spite of his impatient outbursts, the officers whom he commanded remained attached to him for life. 9. These men found that they had a wise and resolute enemy opposed to them. 10. Though he had been sorely buffeted about

the world he was satisfied that the world in itself was good and beautiful.

III.

1. When she mounted the cart, she seemed above the middle height of woman, though in reality she did not exceed it. 2. His eyes which grew brighter with age were then of a deep violet. 3. A small piece of waste land which was intersected by a brook fringed with osier, afforded pasture for a few cows. 4. Most of the houses on either hand were low structures of one storey built heavily of stone. 5. To prevent her falling a victim to her rashness now seemed impossible. 6. As he was indulging these wishes, he was informed that a neighbour of his had found a pan of money underground. 7. Campbell was so affected at the blind and suffering state of the admiral that he was unable to write. 8. Fully believing that the wound was mortal and that he was about to die, he called the chaplain. 9. The horse which bore our hero was shot by one of Gilfillan's party as he discharged his firelock at random. 10. The skirmish sometimes lasted for a whole evening, until one party or the other was victorious.

IV.

Classify the modifiers in the preceding exercises (page 124) on the basis of structure.

V.

Classify the judgments in the following passages on the basis of structure:—

1. The sun poured hot and white upon the long stretch of sandy road. Ellen had hurried through the village and, as it chanced, met no one. Near the post office, on the main street, she saw a familiar figure, which gave her an instant's fear. It was Miss Jane Temple who seemed to be reading a letter which she had in her hand.

She walked steadily and quite rapidly. She passed two or three people; one man, who knew her, said "Hullo, Ellen!" in a surprised way, but asked no questions. After that she walked for a while in the fields along the road so that she might not be seen. The bag was heavy, and so was her heart.

It was nearly dinner time. There were locust trees here and there by the roadside but they had nothing to give her but a flickering shade. She really wished very much that she had eaten more breakfast. If she could see a shop, she

would open her bank, she thought, and buy something. But there were no shops in sight.

It was just noon. The mowed fields on either side of the road lay in a hot blur of sunshine. The long zzing of the locusts seemed to emphasize the stillness. So far the child had been sustained by excitement, but now a dull ache of reality began to make itself felt. She perceived, far off, the moment when resolution would flag. But it was very far off. She would still pretend to herself that she was going to Mercer. Down the white road a little cloud of dust was creeping along. Ellen could hear a low creaking jolt before she could distinguish, in the dusky nimbus, a pedlar's cart. It was covered with sunburnt canvas, and as all the weight was on the front seat, it tilted up behind and sogged upon the front wheels. The white mule which jogged between the shafts was driven by a large person with a ruddy face. He wore spectacles, whose round silver rims looked like little satellites of his moonlight countenance, which had also a halo about it made by a fringe of white whiskers under his chin, and a grey felt hat, worn at the back of his head.

2. Bernard paid the money, well-contented, gave a bow and a scrape, and went away delighted that he had got his opinion. When he reached home it was four in the afternoon; he was tired with his journey, and he resolved to have a good rest. It happened, however, that his hay had been cut for some days, and was now completely dry; and one of his men came to ask if it should be carried in and housed that night."

"This night!" said the farmer's wife, "who ever heard of such a thing? Your master is tired, and the hay can just as well be got in to-morrow." The man said it was no business of his, but the weather might change, and the horses and carts were ready, and the labourers had nothing to do.

To this the angry wife replied that the wind was in a favourable quarter, and that they could not anyway get the work done before nightfall.

Bernard, having listened to both sides of the question, didn't know how to decide, when suddenly he remembered the paper the lawyer had given him. "Stop a minute!" cried he; "I have an opinion—a famous opinion—an opinion that cost me half-a-crown. That's the thing to put

us straight. You are a grand scholar, my dear; tell us what it says." His wife took the paper, and, with some little difficulty, read out these two lines:

"Peter Bernard, never put off till to-morrow what you can do to-day."

"There's the very thing!" cried the farmer. "Quick! out with the men and the carts, and we'll have the hay in at once."

His wife still grumbled, but it was of no use; Bernard was obstinate; he declared that he was not going to pay half-a-crown for nothing, and that, as he had got an opinion from his lawyer, he would follow it, whatever happened. In fact, he set the example himself, and urging his men to the greatest expedition, he did not return to his home till all the hay was safely housed.

Whatever doubts his wife might have entertained as to his wisdom, were fully put at rest by the result; for the weather changed suddenly during the night; an unexpected storm burst over the valley; and when she woke in the morning she saw running through the meadows a brown and turbid flood, carrying in its current the newly-cut hay of her neighbours. All the

farmers close by lost their hay, and Bernard alone had saved his. Having experienced the benefits which followed obedience to the advice of the lawyer, Bernard, from that day forward, never failed to regulate his conduct by the same rule, and in course of time he became one of the richest farmers of the district.

IX.—CONNECTIVES.

(a) *Show the work done by the words in italics.*

(b) *Classify these.*

I.

1. The King *is* loved *by* his subjects. 2. The Queen of Great Britain *and* Ireland *was* crowned *in* 1837. 3. The leaves *are* falling. 4. Men may come *and* men may go, *but* I go on forever. 5. The frosts *were* very severe. 6 The law *of* the wise *is* a fountain *of* life. 7. Lying lips *are* an abomination *to* the Lord. 8. Her ways *are* ways *of* pleasantness *and* all her paths *are* peace. 9. The sacrifice *of* the wicked *is* an abomination *unto* the Lord; *but* the prayer *of* the upright *is* his delight. 10. A prudent man foreseeth the evil and hideth himself; *but* the simple pass on *and* *are* punished.

II.

1. Many *of* the princes *of* the royal house *were* fighting *in* the field. 2. These roots *are* good *for* food, *but* those *are* poisonous. 3. Whiskey *and* water *is* his favourite beverage. 4. *By* the yellow Tiber *was* tumult *and* affright. 5. I cannot meet them here *for* my ships *are* out *of* gear. 6. She must weep *or* she will die. 7. *By* thirty hills I hurry down *or* slip *between* the ridges. 8. Either he *is* ill *or* the letter has gone astray. 9. Her cheek had lost the rose *and* round her neck floated her hair *or* seemed *to* float *in* rest. 10. Not once *or* twice *in* our fair island-story, the path *of* duty *was* the way *to* glory.

III.

1. It *was* at Jerusalem *and* it *was* winter. 2. I did not say *that* he *was* here. 3. He fell *as* fall the dead. 4. You read *but* you do not think. 5. So spun she *and* so sang she *until* the east *was* gray. 6. He died *that* we might live. 7. He took off his shoes *lest* he should be heard. 8. He received great honour *from* the nation, *yet* he *was* not puffed up. 9. Wheat fell *in* price *because* there *was* peace abroad. 10. He must return *except* a passage *be* found.

IV.

1. The more delicate kinds *of* cutlery *were* either made *in* the capital *or* brought *from* the continent. 2. They boasted *that* their hardware *was* highly esteemed. 3. The spot *where* an immense cavalcade halted *to* dine *under* a great oak *is* not yet forgotten. 4. The public service *was* starved *that* courtiers might be pampered. 5. *When* the court soon *after* the Restoration visited Tunbridge Wells there *was* no town. 6. We should greatly err *if* we *were* to suppose such a thing. 7. Men tried *to* read the countenance *of* every minister *as* he went *through* the throng *to and from* the royal closet. 8. Never *was* an Englishman more *at* home *than* *when* he took his ease *in* his inn. 9. She saw the sea draw nearer *and* nearer, *yet* gave no sign *of* alarm. 10. He blushed, *therefore* he *is* guilty.

V.

1. It would not be *at* all strange *if* Mr. Gladstone *were* one *of* the most unpopular men *in* England. 2. He *was* angry *otherwise* he would have remained. 3. He had left *before* I arrived. 4. I shall return *unless* John writes *before* the snow melts. 5. The man holds power *because*

he *was* elected *by* the people. 6. We will not pretend *to* say *what is* the best explanation of this text, *but we are* sure *that* Mr. Gladstone's *is* the worst. 7. We have observed *in* the "Pilgrim's Progress" several pages *which* do not contain a single word *of* more *than* two syllables. 8. Empires *which* branch out widely *are* often more flourishing *for* a little timely pruning. 9. He soon descended *to* the station *whence* he had arisen. 10. He knows *whether* he did it.

MISCELLANEOUS EXERCISES FOR REVIEW.

Separate into propositions, classify, separate into subject and predicate, distinguish examples of real and verbal predication, classify constituent elements on the basis of sentence function.

I.

I come, I come! Ye have called me long,
 I come o'er the mountains with light and song!
 Ye may trace my step o'er the wakening earth,
 By the winds which tell of the violet's birth,
 By the primrose stars in the shadowy grass,
 By the green leaves opening as I pass.

I have breathed on the south, and the chestnut
 flowers
 By thousands have burst from their forest-
 bowers,

And the ancient graves and the fallen fanes
Are veiled with wreaths on Italian plains;—
But it is not for me in my hour of bloom
To speak of the ruin or the tomb!

I have looked o'er the hills of the stormy north,
And the larch has hung all his tassels forth,
The fisher is out on the sunny sea,
And the reindeer bounds o'er the pastures free,
And the pine has a fringe of softer green,
And the moss looks bright where my foot hath
 been.

From the streams and founts I have loosed the
 chain;
They are sweeping on the silvery main,
They are flashing down from the mountain-
 brows,
They are flinging spray o'er the forest-boughs,
They are bursting fresh from the sparry caves,
And the earth resounds with the joy of waves!

II.

The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the
 fold,
And his cohorts were gleaming in purple and
 gold;

And the sheen of their spears was like stars on
the sea,

When the blue waves roll nightly on deep
Galilee.

Like the leaves of the forest when summer is
green,

That host with their banners at sunset was
seen ;

Like the leaves of the forest when autumn hath
blown,

That host on the morrow lay withered and
strown.

For the Angel of Death spread his wings on the
blast,

And breathed in the face of the foe as he
passed ;

And the eyes of the sleepers waxed deadly and
chill,

And their hearts but once heaved, and for ever
were still !

And there lay the steed with his nostril all wide,
But through it there rolled not the breath of his
pride.

And the foam of his gasping lay white on the
turf,

And cold as the spray on the rock-beating surf.

And there lay the rider, distorted and pale,
With the dew on his brow and the rust on his
mail ;

The tents were all silent, the banners alone,
The lances unlifted, the trumpet unblown.

And the widows of Ashur are loud in their wail,
And the idols are broke in the temple of Baal ;
And the might of the Gentile, unsmote by the
sword,
Hath melted like snow in the glance of the
Lord.

III.

Under a spreading chestnut tree
The village smithy stands ;
The smith, a mighty man is he,
With large and sinewy hands ;
And the muscles of his brawny arms
Are strong as iron bands.

His hair is crisp and black and long ;
His face is like the tan ;
His brow is wet with honest sweat,
He earns whate'er he can,
And looks the whole world in the face,
For he owes not any man.

Week in, week out, from morn till night,
You can hear his bellows blow ;
You can hear him swing his heavy sledge,
With measured beat and slow,
Like a sexton ringing the village bell,
When the evening sun is low.

And children coming home from school
Look in at the open door ;
They love to see the flaming forge,
And hear the bellows roar,
And catch the burning sparks that fly
Like chaff from a threshing floor.

He goes on Sunday to the church,
And sits among his boys ;
He hears the parson pray and preach ;
He hears his daughter's voice
Singing in the village choir,
And it makes his heart rejoice.

It sounds to him like her mother's voice
Singing in Paradise !
He needs must think of her once more,
How in the grave she lies ;
And with his hard, rough hand he wipes
A tear out of his eyes.

Toiling,—rejoicing,—sorrowing,
Onward through life he goes ;
Each morning sees some task begin
Each evening sees it close ;
Something attempted, something done,
Has earned a night's repose.

Thanks, thanks to thee, my worthy friend,
For the lesson thou hast taught ;
Thus, at the flaming forge of life,
Our fortunes must be wrought ;
Thus on its sounding anvil, shaped
Each burning deed and thought !

IV.

Luxemburg, however, was determined to try whether even this position could be maintained against the superior numbers and the impetuous valour of his soldiers. Soon after sunrise the roar of the cannon began to be heard. William's batteries did much execution before the French artillery could be so placed as to return the fire. It was eight o'clock before the close fighting began. The village of Neerwinden was regarded by both commanders as the point on which everything depended. There an attack was made by the French left wing commanded by Montchevreuil, a veteran officer of high reputa-

tion, and by Berwick, who, though young, was fast rising to an eminent place among the captains of his time. Berwick led the onset, and forced his way into the village, but was soon driven out again with a terrible carnage. His followers fled or perished; he, while trying to rally them, and cursing them for not doing their duty better, was surrounded by foes. He concealed his white cockade, and hoped to be able, by the help of his native tongue, to pass himself off as an officer of the English army. But his face was recognized by one of his mother's brothers, George Churchill, who held on that day the command of a brigade. A hurried embrace was exchanged between the kinsmen; and the uncle conducted the nephew to William, who, as long as everything seemed to be going well, remained in the rear. The meeting of the King and the captive, united by such close domestic ties, and divided by such inexpressible injuries, was a strange sight. Both behaved as became them. William uncovered, and addressed to his prisoner a few words of courteous greeting. Berwick's only reply was a solemn bow. The King put on his hat, the Duke put on his hat, and the cousins parted forever.

V.

Imagine yourself on a day early in November, floating slowly down the Mississippi River. The near approach of winter brings millions of water-fowls on whistling wings from the countries of the north, to seek a milder climate in which to sojourn for a season.

The eagle is seen perched on the highest branch of the tallest tree by the margin of the broad stream. His glistening but pitiless eye looks over water and land, and sees objects afar off. He listens to every sound that comes to his quick ear, glancing now and then to the earth beneath, lest the light tread of the rabbit may pass unheard.

His mate is perched on the other side of the river, and now and then warns him by a cry to continue patient. At this well-known call he partly opens his broad wings and answers to her voice in tones not unlike the laugh of a madman. Ducks and many smaller waterfowl are seen passing rapidly towards the south; but the eagle heeds them not—they are for the time beneath his attention.

The next moment, however, the wild, trumpet-like sound of a distant swan is heard. The

eagle suddenly shakes his body, raises his wings, and makes ready for flight. A shriek from his mate comes across the stream, for she is fully as watchful as he.

The snow-white bird is now in sight; her long neck is stretched forward; her eyes are as watchful as those of her enemy; her large wings seem with difficulty to support the weight of her body. Nearer and nearer she comes. The eagle has marked her for his prey.

As the swan is about to pass the dreaded pair, the eagle starts from his perch with an awful scream. He glides through the air like a falling star, and, like a flash of lightning, darts upon the timid bird, which now, in agony and despair, seeks to escape the grasp of his cruel talons. She would plunge into the stream did not the eagle force her to remain in the air by striking at her from beneath.

The hope of escape is soon given up by the swan. She has already become much weakened. She is about to gasp her last breath when the eagle strikes with his talons the under side of her wing, and forces the dying bird to fall in a slanting direction upon the nearest shore.

Then it is that you may see the cruel spirit of this dreaded enemy of the feathered race. He presses down his strong feet, and drives his claws deeper and deeper into the heart of the swan. He screams with delight as he watches the last feeble struggles of his prey.

The eagle's mate has watched every movement that he has made; and, if she did not assist him in capturing the swan, it was because she felt sure that his power and courage were quite sufficient for the deed. She now sails up to the spot where he is waiting for her, and both together turn the breast of the luckless swan upward and gorge themselves with gore.

VI.

But meanwhile in the centre great deeds of arms
were wrought;

There Aulus the Dictator, and there Valerius
fought.

Aulus with his good broadsword a bloody pas-
sage cleared

To where, amidst the thickest foes, he saw the
long white beard.

Flat lighted that good broadsword upon proud
Tarquin's head.

He dropped the lance ; he dropped the reins ; he
fell as fall the dead.

Down Aulus springs to slay him, with eyes like
coals of fire ;

But faster Titus hath sprung down, and hath
bestrode his sire.

Latian captains, Roman knights, fast down to
earth they spring,

And hand to hand they fight on foot around the
ancient king.

First Titus gave tall Cæso a death wound in the
face ;

Tall Cæso was the bravest man of the brave
Fabian race ;

Aulus slew Rex of Gabii, the priest of Juno's
shrine :

Valerius smote down Julius, of Rome's great
Julian line ;

Julius, who left his mansion high on the Velian
hill,

And through all turns of weal and woe followed
proud Tarquin still.

Now right across proud Tarquin a corpse was
Julius laid ;

And Titus groaned with rage and grief, and at
Valerius made.

Valerius struck at Titus, and lopped off half his
crest ;

But Titus stabbed Valerius a span deep in the
breast.

Like a mast snapped by the tempest, Valerius
reeled and fell.

Ah ! woe is me for the good house that loves the
people well !

Then shouted loud the Latines, and with one
rush they bore

The struggling Romans backward three lances'
length and more ;

And up they took proud Tarquin, and laid him
on a shield,

And four strong yeomen bare him, still senseless,
from the field.

VII.

The appearance of Rip, with his long, grizzled beard, his rusty fowling piece, his uncouth dress, and an army of women and children that had gathered at his heels, soon attracted the attention of the tavern politicians. They crowded round him, eyeing him from head to foot with great curiosity. The orator bustled up to him, and, drawing him partly aside, inquired, " on

which side he voted?" Rip stared in vacant stupidity. Another short but busy little fellow pulled him by the arm, and rising on tiptoe, inquired in his ear, "whether he was Federal or Democrat." Rip was equally at a loss to comprehend the question; when a knowing self-important old gentleman, in a sharp cocked hat, made his way through the crowd, putting them to the right and left with his elbows as he passed, and planting himself before Van Winkle, with one arm akimbo, the other resting on his cane, his keen eyes and sharp hat penetrating as it were, into his very soul, demanded in an austere tone, "what brought him to the election with a gun on his shoulder, and a mob at his heels, and whether he meant to breed a riot in the village?"

—"Alas! gentlemen," cried Rip, somewhat dismayed, "I am a poor, quiet man, a native of the place, and a loyal subject of the king, God bless him!"

Here a general shout burst from the bystanders—"A tory! a tory! a spy! a refugee! hustle him! away with him!" It was with great difficulty that the self-important man in a cocked hat restored order; and having as-

sumed a tenfold austerity of brow, demanded again of the unknown culprit, what he came there for, and whom he was seeking? The poor man humbly assured him that he meant no harm, but merely came there in search of some of his neighbours, who used to keep about the tavern.

“Well—who are they?—name them.”

Rip bethought himself a moment, and inquired, “Where’s Nicholas Vedder?”

There was a silence for a little while, when an old man replied, in a thin and piping voice, “Nicholas Vedder!” why, he is dead and gone these eighteen years! There was a wooden tombstone in the churchyard that used to tell all about him, but that’s rotten and gone too.”

“Where’s Brom Dutcher?”

“Oh, he went off to the army in the beginning of the war; some say he was killed at the storming of Stony Point—others say he was drowned in a squall at the foot of Antony’s Nose. I don’t know—he never came back again.”

“Where’s Van Bummel, the schoolmaster?”

“He went off to the wars, too, was a great militia general, and is now in Congress.”

Rip's heart died away at hearing of these sad changes in his home and friends, and finding himself thus alone in the world. Every answer puzzled him, too, by treating of such enormous lapses of time, and of matters which he could not understand: war—Congress—Stony Point!—he had no courage to ask after any more friends, but cried out in despair, "Does nobody here know Rip Van Winkle?"

"Oh, Rip Van Winkle!" exclaimed two or three. "Oh to be sure! that's Rip Van Winkle yonder, leaning against the tree."

Rip looked, and beheld a precise counterpart of himself as he went up the mountain; apparently as lazy, and certainly as ragged. The poor fellow was now completely confounded. He doubted his own identity, and whether he was himself or another man. In the midst of his bewilderment, the man in the cocked hat demanded who he was, and what was his name?

"God knows," exclaimed he, at his wits' end; "I'm not myself—I'm somebody else—that's me yonder—no—that's somebody else, got into my shoes—I was myself last night, but I fell asleep on the mountain, and they've changed my gun,

and everything's changed, and I'm changed, and I can't tell what's my name, or who I am!"

The bystanders began now to look at each other, nod, wink significantly, and tap their fingers against their foreheads. There was a whisper, also, about securing the gun, and keeping the old fellow from doing mischief; at the very suggestion of which, the self-important man with the cocked hat retired with some precipitation. At this critical moment a fresh, comely woman passed through the throng to get a peep at the gray-bearded man. She had a chubby child in her arms, which, frightened at his looks, began to cry. "Hush, Rip," cried she, "hush, you little fool; the old man won't hurt you." The name of the child, the air of the mother, the tone of her voice, all awakened a train of recollections in his mind.

"What is your name, my good woman?" asked he.

"Judith Gardenier."

"And your father's name?"

"Ah, poor man, Rip Van Winkle was his name, but it's twenty years since he went away from home with his gun, and never has been heard of

since—his dog came home without him; but whether he shot himself, or was carried away by the Indians, nobody can tell. I was then but a little girl.”

Rip had but one question more to ask; but he put it with a faltering voice:

“Where’s your mother?”

“Oh, she too had died but a short time since: she broke a blood-vessel in a fit of passion at a New England peddler.”

There was a drop of comfort, at least, in this intelligence. The honest man could contain himself no longer. He caught his daughter and her child in his arms. “I am your father!” cried he—“Young Rip Van Winkle once—old Rip Van Winkle now!—Does nobody know poor Rip Van Winkle?”

All stood amazed, until an old woman, tottering out from among the crowd, put her hand to her brow, and peering under it in his face for a moment, exclaimed, “Sure enough! it is Rip Van Winkle—it is himself! Welcome home again, old neighbour—Why, where have you been these twenty long years?”

Rip’s story was soon told, for the whole twenty years had been to him but as one night. The

neighbours stared when they heard it; some were seen to wink at each other, and put their tongues in their cheeks; and the self-important man in the cocked hat, who, when the alarm was over, had returned to the field, screwed down the corners of his mouth, and shook his head—upon which there was a general shaking of the head throughout the assemblage.

VIII.

The strange news of his lost father soon roused the prince from the stupid fit into which he had fallen. He followed in amazement the sound of Ariel's voice, till it led him to Prospero and Miranda, who were sitting under the shade of a large tree.

Now, Miranda had never seen a man before, except her own father. "Miranda," said Prospero, "tell me what you are looking at yonder."

"O father!" said Miranda, in a strange surprise, "surely that is a spirit. Dear me! how it looks about! Believe me, sir, it is a beautiful creature. Is it not a spirit?"

"No, girl," answered her father. "It eats, and sleeps, and has senses such as we have. This young man you see was in the ship. He is

somewhat altered by grief, or you might call him a handsome person. He has lost his companions, and is wandering about to find them."

Miranda, who thought all men had grave faces and gray beards like her father, was delighted with the appearance of this beautiful young prince; and Ferdinand, seeing such a lovely lady in this desert place, and from the strange sounds he had heard, expecting nothing but wonders, thought he was upon an enchanted island, and that Miranda was the goddess of the place, and as such he began to address her.

She timidly answered she was no goddess, but a simple maid, and was going to give him an account of herself, when Prospero interrupted her. He was well pleased to find they admired each other, for he plainly perceived they had fallen in love at first sight; but to try Ferdinand's constancy, he resolved to throw some difficulties in their way. Therefore, advancing forward, he addressed the prince with a stern air, telling him he came to the island as a spy, to take it from him who was the lord of it.

"Follow me," said he. "I will tie you neck and feet together. You shall drink sea-water; shell-fish, withered roots, and husks of acorns

shall be your food." "No," said Ferdinand, "I will resist such entertainment till I see a more powerful enemy," and drew his sword. But Prospero, waving his magic wand, fixed him to the spot where he stood, so that he had no power to move.

Miranda hung upon her father, saying, "Why are you so ungentle? Have pity, sir; I will be his surety. This is the second man I ever saw, and to me he seems a true one."

"Silence," said her father; "one word more will make me chide you, girl! What! an advocate for an impostor! You think there are no more such fine men, having seen only him and Caliban. I tell you, foolish girl, most men as far excel this as he does Caliban." This he said to prove his daughter's constancy; and she replied, "My affections are most humble; I have no wish to see a goodlier man."

"Come on, young man," said Prospero to the prince; "you have no power to disobey me."

"I have not, indeed," answered Ferdinand; and, not knowing that it was by magic he was deprived of all power of resistance, he was astonished to find himself so strangely compelled to follow Prospero. Looking back on Miranda

as long as he could see her, he said, as he went after Prospero into the cave, "My spirits are all bound up, as if I were in a dream; but this man's threats, and the weakness which I feel, would seem light to me, if from my prison I might once a day behold this fair maid."

Prospero kept Ferdinand not long confined within the cell. He soon brought out his prisoner, and set him a severe task to perform, taking care to let his daughter know the hard labour he had imposed on him, and then, pretending to go into his study, he secretly watched them both.

Prospero had commanded Ferdinand to pile up some heavy logs of wood. Kings' sons not being much used to laborious work, Miranda soon found her lover almost dying with fatigue. "Alas!" said she, "do not work so hard. My father is at his studies; he is safe for these three hours: pray rest yourself."

"Oh, my dear lady," said Ferdinand, "I dare not. I must finish my task before I take my rest."

"If you will sit down," said Miranda, "I will carry your logs the while." But this Ferdinand would by no means agree to. Instead of a help,

Miranda became a hindrance, for they began a long conversation, so that the business of log-carrying went on very slowly.

Prospero, who had enjoined Ferdinand this task merely as a trial of his love, was not at his books, as his daughter supposed, but was standing by them invisible, to overhear what they said.

Ferdinand inquired her name, which she told him, saying it was against her father's express command she did so.

Prospero only smiled at this first instance of his daughter's disobedience, for having by his magic art caused his daughter to fall in love so suddenly, he was not angry that she showed her love by forgetting to obey his commands. And he listened, well pleased, to a long speech of Ferdinand's, in which he professed to love her above all the ladies he ever saw.

In answer to his praise of her beauty, which he said exceeded all the women in the world, she replied, "I do not remember the face of any woman, nor have I seen any more men than you, my good friend, and my dear father. How features are abroad, I know not; but believe me, sir, I would not wish any companion in the

world but you, nor can my imagination form any shape but yours that I could like. But, sir, I fear I talk to you too freely, and my father's precepts I forget."

At this Prospero smiled, and nodded his head, as much as to say, "This goes on exactly as I could wish. My girl will be Queen of Naples."

And then Ferdinand, in another fine, long speech (for young princes speak in courtly phrases), told the innocent Miranda he was heir to the crown of Naples, and that she should be his queen.

"Ah! sir," said she, "I am a fool to weep at what I am glad of. I will answer you in plain and holy innocence. I am your wife if you will marry me."

IX.

So blended and intertwined in this life are occasions of laughter and of tears, that I cannot yet recall, without smiling, an incident which occurred at that time, and which had nearly put a stop to the immediate execution of my plan. I had a trunk of immense weight; for, besides my clothes, it contained nearly all my library. The difficulty was to get this removed to a carrier's. My room was at an aerial elevation in

the house, and (what was worse) the staircase which communicated with this angle of the building was accessible only by a gallery, which passed the head-master's chamber door. I was a favourite with all the servants; and knowing that any of them would screen me, and act confidentially, I communicated my embarrassment to a groom of the head-master's. The groom swore he would do anything I wished; and when the time arrived, went upstairs to bring the trunk down. This I feared was beyond the strength of any one man; however, the groom was a man

Of Atlantean shoulders, fit to bear
The weight of mightiest monarchies,

and had a back as capacious as Salisbury Plains. Accordingly, he persisted in bringing down the trunk alone, while I stood waiting at the foot of the last flight, in anxiety for the event. For some time I heard him descending with slow and firm steps; but, unfortunately, from his trepidation, as he drew near the dangerous quarter, within a few steps of the gallery, his foot slipped, and the mighty burden, falling from his shoulders, gained such increase of impetus at each step of the descent, that, on reaching the

bottom, it trundled, or rather leaped, right across, with the noise of twenty devils, against the very bedroom door of the archididascalus. My first thought was, that all was lost, and that my only chance of executing a retreat was to sacrifice my baggage. However, on reflection, I determined to abide the issue. The groom was in the utmost alarm, both on his own account and on mine, but, in spite of this, so irresistibly had the sense of the ludicrous, in this unhappy *contretemps*, taken possession of his fancy, that he sung out a long, loud, and canorous peal of laughter, that might have wakened the Seven Sleepers. At the sound of this resonant merriment within the very ears of insulted authority, I could not forbear joining in it; subdued to this, not so much by the unhappy *etourderie* of the trunk, as by the effect it had upon the groom. We both expected, as a matter of course, that Dr. — would sally out of his room; for, in general, if but a mouse stirred, he sprung out like a mastiff from his kennel. Strange to say, however, on this occasion, when the noise of laughter had ceased, no sound, or rustling, even, was to be heard in the bedroom. Dr. — had a painful complaint, which sometimes keeping

him awake, made him sleep, perhaps, when it did come, the deeper. Gathering courage from the silence, the groom hoisted his burden again, and accomplished the remainder of his descent without accident. I waited until I saw the trunk placed on a wheelbarrow, and on its road to the carrier's; then, "with Providence my guide," I set off on foot, carrying a small parcel, with some articles of dress under my arm; a favourite English poet in one pocket; and a small 12mo. volume, containing about nine plays of Euripides, in the other.

X.

One Jewish quality these Arabs manifest; the outcome of many or of all high qualities; what we may call religiosity. From of old they had been zealous worshippers, according to their light. They worshipped the stars, as Sabeans; worshipped many natural objects,—recognized them as symbols, immediate manifestations, of the Maker of Nature. It was wrong; and yet not wholly wrong. All God's works are still in a sense symbols of God. Do we not, as I urged, still account it a merit to recognize a certain inexhaustible significance, "poetic beauty" as we name it, in all natural objects whatsoever? A

man is a poet, and honoured, for doing that, and speaking or singing it,—a kind of diluted worship. They had many Prophets, these Arabs; teachers each to his tribe, each according to the light he had. But indeed, have we not from of old the noblest of proofs, still palpable to every one of us, of what devoutness and noble-mindedness had dwelt in these rustic thoughtful peoples? Biblical critics seemed agreed that our own Book of Job was written in that region of the world. I call that, apart from all theories about it, one of the grandest things ever written with pen. One feels, indeed, as if it were not Hebrew; such a noble universality, different from noble patriotism or sectarianism, reigns in it. A noble Book; all men's Book! It is our first, oldest statement of the never-ending Problem,—man's destiny, and God's ways with him here in this earth. And all in such free flowing outlines; grand in its sincerity, in its simplicity; in its epic melody, and repose of reconciliation. There is the seeing eye, the mildly understanding heart. So *true* everyway; true eyesight and vision for all things; material things no less than spiritual: the Horse,—“hast thou clothed his neck with *thunder*?”—he “*laughs* at the shak-

ing of the spear!" Such living likenesses were never since drawn. Sublime sorrow, sublime reconciliation; oldest choral melody as of the heart of mankind;—so soft, and great; as the summer midnight, as the world with its seas and stars! There is nothing written, I think, in the Bible or out of it, of equal literary merit.

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